

## ***Power and Values in “The American Century”***

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*Note to readers from Bob Keohane. What follows are the main sections of a proposal that Peter Katzenstein and I have developed for a joint project, which we would organize. The Duke conference on February 21-22 will be the first time this proposal has been discussed with a group. Much, it will be clear, remains to be worked out with respect to this project. I look forward with a mixture of anticipation and trepidation to comments on this early draft.*

At the end of World War II Henry Luce spoke of the coming of an American century. Today commentators across the political spectrum emphasize America's dominant military capabilities and economic strength. Many observers have also argued that the United States uniquely benefits from the wave of economic liberalization and democratization that followed the end of the Cold War. During the 1990s, the political scientist Joseph S. Nye coined the phrase, "soft power," to suggest the importance of being admired, so that "others want what you want."<sup>1</sup> He argued that the United States, being much-admired, had a capacity to use soft power, enabling it to achieve its objectives with less expenditure of material power, or hard power. It seemed for a while as if the United States was in a "virtuous circle," in which its success caused it to be more admired, which in turn facilitated its influence, and its further success.

The events of September 11, 2001, and the hostility against the United States that they revealed, seem to indicate that the image of a virtuous circle is at best incomplete. Values can clash as well as converge. People around the world sympathized with Americans when terrorists attacked the Pentagon and the World Trade Center; but it does not appear that American soft power has helped with the US-led "war against terrorism." Rather than simply being admired for its freedom and prosperity, the United States finds that some components of its soft power make it the object of fear and distrust. Both its mass culture industries and its evangelical Protestantism generate strong counter-reactions. In an extreme example of this reaction against American soft power, the Taliban banned television and imprisoned missionaries. Soft power can operate dialectically, not just in a linear fashion.

If America's values can be seen to be at odds with those of much of the rest of the world, we should still ask, which America and which values? For several decades American politics has centered on the nature of American identity, specifically on tensions within an increasingly multicultural and at the same time an increasingly religious polity. Much energized by adaptations of cultural imports and enormously creative in sending its many different fashions and fads abroad, America's popular culture industries are helping to create new bonds in a polity that is rapidly moving toward a non-white majority within the next few decades.

These changes in American society are reflected in American politics. Both major political parties are coalitions of interests, so it is an oversimplification to view American politics in terms of just two factions. Nevertheless, the coalition of interests supporting Democrats is multicultural and largely secular, whereas the Republican Party, still largely white in ethnic composition, has been transformed during the last generation by the rise of the Christian Right. While the two major parties in American politics agree on free-market economics on a global scale, they disagree sharply on the issues of social conservatism and the unilateral exercise of military power. Without going into details, the general point is that changes in America's secular and religious identities have changed

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<sup>1</sup> Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's only Superpower Can't Go it Alone* (New York: Oxford University Press), pp.8-12.

American domestic politics, and are having noticeable effects on American foreign policy. When we discuss value conflicts in world politics, we need to remember that many of these conflicts have echoes within American society itself.

### *Three Arguments on Power and Value Conflicts*

Any discussion of contemporary power and value conflicts needs to begin with the recognition that we live in an era of an American empire. At the moment, this empire is taking a highly militarized form: as Robert Kagan writes, America, and only America, is from Mars.<sup>2</sup> But in a broader historical context, the American empire continues to combine traditional elements of territorial power with novel forms of non-territorial power. Political tensions between both forms of power have existed since the beginning of the republic. The policy of Open Door clashed with belated colonial acquisition in the late 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. In the 20<sup>th</sup> century, however, it was the Open Door principle that drove American foreign policy. Access to society and economy rather than the occupation of territory was at the core of America's rising importance in world politics. As Samuel P. Huntington observed thirty years ago, "American expansion has been characterized not by the acquisition of new territories but by their penetration."<sup>3</sup>

Contemporary power and value conflicts in world politics revolve around the United States, because the United States is the imperial country. They therefore take the form of anti-Americanism, which seems to be rising on a global basis.<sup>4</sup> Three different arguments can be put forward about the causal mechanisms driving these conflicts. Each of them is embedded in a substantial literature, pre-dating contemporary concern with terrorism, and each deserves to be taken seriously. Taking them seriously means not merely stating them, but indicating the observable implications of each argument: what should be true if the argument is correct.<sup>5</sup>

- 1) *The Power Imbalance Argument.* Thucydides famously argued that "the real cause" of the Peloponnesian War was "the growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm this inspired in Lacedaemon."<sup>6</sup> Generations of balance of power theorists have argued that imbalances of power lead to the formation of balancing coalitions: "secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side."<sup>7</sup> This set of arguments suggests that we may now simply be observing the predictable effects of extraordinary US military capabilities, exercised without sufficient subtlety or restraint. Quite naturally, in this view, other states feel threatened by US power and seek to protect themselves.

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<sup>2</sup> Robert Kagan, "Power and Weakness," *Policy Review* 113 (June-July 2002): 3-28.

<sup>3</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, "Transnational Organization in World Politics," *World Politics* XXV, no. 3 (April 1973), p. 344.

<sup>4</sup> Adam Clymer, "World Survey Says Negative Views of U.S. Are Rising," *The New York Times* (5 December, 2002): A22.

<sup>5</sup> On "observable implications," see Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

<sup>6</sup> Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, the Crawley translation, revised by T.E. Wick (New York: Modern Library, 1982), p. 14.

<sup>7</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 127.

This view has some clear observable implications. We should observe quite general resistance to US power around the world, but it should be particularly concentrated in the potential alternative centers of power, such as the European Union, Russia, India and China. It is these states that have the greatest capacity to resist and the greatest ability to choose. Although the power argument is indeterminate in telling us whether other major states will balance against the leading world power at a given moment or join its coalition, it is only these states that have the option to oppose the leader. If the power imbalance argument is correct, we should observe the beginnings of a coalition among some of these states to check the United States.

- 2) *The Globalization Backlash Argument.* Economic historians have observed that the first wave of globalization, in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, led to a “globalization backlash” that culminated in the “dark years between the two world wars.”<sup>8</sup> Globalization affects the distribution of income, and those adversely affected can be expected to resist such change. The classic statement of this argument is by Karl Polanyi, who claimed that the liberal world economy of the 19<sup>th</sup> century was destroyed by the effects of the market, emanating into politics and society: “a civilization was being disrupted by the blind action of soulless institutions the only purpose of which was the automatic increase of material welfare.”<sup>9</sup> In Polanyi’s argument, the unregulated market violates deep-seated social values, and thus supports political movements in support of closure. In the historical period about which he was writing, it eventually led, in his interpretation, to fascism.

Applied to contemporary globalization, Polanyi’s argument also has implications that could be empirically observed. Hostility to the United States should follow in the wake of markets disrupting traditional institutions and social practices leading to increased inequality of economic condition, without generating new and effective institutions in place of the old ones. Hostility should therefore emanate from those areas of the world experiencing the “creative destruction,” in Joseph Schumpeter’s words, of capitalism. An influx of capital and the opening of markets to the world should be associated with anti-Americanism.

- 3) *The Conflicting Identities Argument.* The “national interest,” as Henry R. Nau has argued, requires assessments not only with respect to power but also with respect to basic values and identities.<sup>10</sup> According to the conflicting identities argument, anti-Americanism is generated by cultural and religious identities

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<sup>8</sup> Kevin H. O’Rourke and Jeffrey G. Williamson, *Globalization and History: the Evolution of a Nineteenth-Century Atlantic Economy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), p. 93.

<sup>9</sup> Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957, first published 1944), p. 219.

<sup>10</sup> Henry R. Nau, *At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002).

that are antithetical to the values being generated and exported by American culture – from Christianity to the commercialization of sex.

The products of secular mass culture, as Seyla Benhabib notes, are also a source of international value conflict. They are bringing images of sexual freedom and decadence, female emancipation, and equality among the sexes into the homes of patriarchal and authoritarian communities, Muslim and otherwise.<sup>11</sup> At the same time and partly in response to social changes in America, religion has become a “very important” fact in the lives of 59 percent of Americans, about twice as many as in Britain and Canada and about five times as many as in France and Japan. In the words of Andrew Kohut, director of the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, this “represents an important divide between the United States and our traditional allies” on issues such as abortion, the death penalty, and the use of new biological technologies.<sup>12</sup> And Christian missionaries are deeply grating to Leninist capitalism in China and to Muslim fundamentalism throughout the Islamic world.

The globalization of the media has made these images not only available but also unavoidable to people around the world. One reaction is admiration and emulation, captured in Nye’s concept of soft power. But another reaction is antipathy and resistance. For those with this response, anti-Americanism has become a form of universal nationalism, at times articulated through symbols and songs imported from America and adapted to specific national, regional or local conditions. Such anti-Americanism can be useful in legitimating national regimes otherwise severely lacking in legitimacy, but it is equally useful to oppositional movements seeking to discredit regimes that are allied with the United States despite identity clashes. The content of anti-Americanism is also variable. Secular states, as in Western Europe or East Asia, will object more to the rise of religiosity in American life and foreign policy, and less to the effects of the spread of American popular culture. Religious states, as in the Middle East and South Asia, will object to their exposure to the products of American popular culture and, in the case of Christian missionaries, to the rise of American religiosity. The latter set of tensions is more severe, and more conducive to violence, than the former.

The observable implication of the conflicting identities argument is that hostility to the United States should be concentrated in two sets of countries: 1) those whose peoples strongly believe in a religion that espouses values antithetical to the religious and/or secular values emanating from the United States; and 2) those whose peoples are highly nationalistic.

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<sup>11</sup> Seyla Benhabib, “Unholy Wars: Reclaiming Democratic Virtues after September 11,” in Craig Calhoun, Paul Price and Ashley Timmer, eds., *Understanding September 11* (New York: New Press, 2002), pp. 251-52.

<sup>12</sup> Pew Research Center poll, December 2002. *Ithaca Journal* (December 20, 2002): 2A.

In our way of thinking these three sets of arguments, although distinct, are not necessarily antithetical to one another. Samuel P. Huntington’s portrayal of Islam as a “civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power”<sup>13</sup> finds its American parallel in a people convinced of the superiority both of their own society and of their military power. In both cases, identity and power are linked. Since globalization has both economic and cultural dimensions, our second and third arguments are also closely related to one another, as Benjamin Barber made clear in the title of his 1995 book, *Jihad vs. McWorld*.<sup>14</sup> Indeed, it seems quite plausible to expect different combinations of all three arguments to be at work in different situations. If we are to explain variations in attitudes toward America, we will have to examine more closely the causal mechanisms generating value conflict between the United States and a variety of other societies.

*The Dialectics of Power and Value Conflicts*

Our analysis will focus on two different aspects of the power and value conflicts that we have in mind. The first dimension ranks polities along the dimension of liberal rights: what is the extent to which the identity of states is built on governmental polities that respect liberal freedoms? The second dimension ranks polities along the dimension of secular and religious values: what is the degree to which the identity of people in the society is defined by religious or secular commitments? The rough schema that results is shown below.

**Figure 1. Value Configurations in Contemporary World Polities**

<i>More secular</i>	Europe	China Japan/ S. Korea
	US	
<i>More religious</i>	India	Pakistan Saudi Arabia
	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>illiberal</i>

The schematic representation of value configurations that are in all polities contested and changing has no more than heuristic value for comparative analysis. One point, however, emerges quite clearly. Along the secular-religious dimension the United States is quite distinct both from other industrial countries in Europe as well as China and Japan in East Asia, on the one hand, and from Islamic and South Asian countries, on the other. As noted above, compared to Europe, the United States is a highly religious,

<sup>13</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), p. 217.

<sup>14</sup> Benjamin R. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld* (New York: Times Books, 1995).

churchgoing society. Compared to Islamic countries, on the other hand, the United States appears extremely secular, and the liberalism of its dominant values conflicts at key points with traditional Islamic practices.

Divergence in values can have a significant impact on power relationships. Shared values reduce the material costs of exercising power, while divergent values increase those costs. This is a key insight of Max Weber's theory of legitimacy. Theorists of soft power have adapted Weber from situations of emulation to a wider variety of situations, including those involving antipathy.<sup>15</sup> United States efforts to disrupt and destroy al-Qaeda depend in part on proactive intelligence and police work by countries such as Indonesia, and by at least passive acceptance of US actions by countries such as Yemen. The degree of sympathy or antipathy on the part of these societies toward the United States will affect their governments' policies, and therefore the efficacy of American policies. Likewise, if the United States seeks to coerce what it calls "evil states," Iraq or North Korea, through diplomacy short of war, into destroying their weapons of mass destruction, the credibility of its threats will depend in part on the supportive policies of Iraq's and North Korea's neighbors. The credibility of threats and promises is a function, in part, of the compatibility of values between the United States and its partners in the Middle East and in East Asia.

Undoubtedly, power relationships also shape values. One way in which they do so is to transform institutions, both political and social, and thus to transform collective identities and shared values. United States dominance over Germany and Japan after World War II led, for instance, to the creation of distinctively German and Japanese versions of modern democracy. Educational reform, the erosion of hierarchical social practices, the introduction and securing of electoral politics, and a more or less independent judiciary have, with the passing of time, transformed both polities. In Iran, it was the revolution of 1979 that created first a theocracy and, after a rallying of modernist reformers, a dual polity in which religious fundamentalists and reformers are battling over the character of contemporary Iran. More recently, US domination over South Korea led, haltingly at first, then more strongly, to the creation of thriving democratic institutions in that country, which now seeks to fashion a policy toward North Korea that favors engagement and détente over the U.S. preference for isolation and containment.

Furthermore, following the power imbalance argument, overwhelming power can generate opposition. Such opposition can be reinforced by the construction of values of anti-Americanism, sometimes cast in the idiom of America, that are antithetical to those of the world power. States whose leaders seek autonomy may have incentives to foster values that diverge from those of the dominant state.

We propose in this project to focus analysis on the intersection of evolving power and value relationships by connecting two styles of analysis, utilitarian and constructivist, which help to define the contemporary social sciences. Proponents of these styles of analysis have been engaged in a debate, lasting now for more than a century, on the irresolvable ontological and epistemological issues that constitute and divide them. The

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<sup>15</sup> Nye, *The Paradox of American Power*.

first, utilitarian model of behavior focuses on preferences, incentives and strategies and a presumed universal rationality for intentional choices by actors. The second, constructivist model emphasizes how social practices depend on and often encourage multilayered consciousness for self-reflective actors. These actors are involved in the recursive structuring of individual agency, cultural meaning and institutional form.

In utilitarian models, preferences are typically assumed. The central issue for actors in these models is to devise strategies that enable them to maximize their utilities in view of the constraints imposed by their limited resources and problems of collective action.<sup>16</sup> Since world politics lacks a comprehensive and enforceable legal structure, the key resources identified by utilitarian models as applied to world politics are those that confer power, defined in terms of the ability to achieve favorable outcomes, on their possessors. In utilitarian models, power is a characteristic of relationships rather than of actors, and therefore depends in part on the institutional context. Institutions may reflect prevailing ideas as well as material reality. In addition, power relationships depend on intangible factors such as information, credibility, and trust.<sup>17</sup>

In the constructivist tradition, institutions are seen as even more fundamental, since they define conceptions of identity and legitimate agency. Ideologies and identities serve more than instrumental purposes. Social practices are shaped by roles and norms that define standards of appropriate practice. Social institutions constitute actor identities and interests and shape the norms that also help define interests. As James March and Johan Olson write in an often neglected chapter of their much-cited book, “political processes are as much concerned with managing interpretation and creating visions as they are with clarifying decisions.”<sup>18</sup>

An interdisciplinary analysis of power and value conflict in world politics that draws on the insights of political science, sociology, anthropology and history will benefit from a self-conscious analytical and methodological eclecticism that embraces both the utilitarian and the constructivist model.<sup>19</sup> On the one hand we intend to evaluate the observable implications of the power imbalance, globalization backlash and conflicting identities arguments under conditions varying across time and space. On the

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<sup>16</sup> On issues of collective action the works of Mancur Olson are exemplary, in particular *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965) and *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982).

<sup>17</sup> The classic work on credibility is still Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960). On trust, see Robert D. Putman, *Making Democracy Work* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). On utilitarian institutional theories as applied to world politics, see Robert O. Keohane, “Governance in a Partially Globalized World,” *American Political Science Review* vol. 95, no. 1 (March 2001), pp. 1-13.

<sup>18</sup> James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics* (New York: Free Press, 1989), p. 51.

<sup>19</sup> Peter J. Katzenstein and Rudy Sil, “Rethinking Security in East Asia: A Case for Analytical Eclecticism,” in Allen Carlson, Peter J. Katzenstein, and J.J. Suh, eds., *Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity, Power and Efficiency* (under review, Stanford University Press).

other hand, the constructivist model of social practices permits us to uncover inductively the causal mechanisms that are connecting institutions, actors, and political practices in evolving contexts in world politics.<sup>20</sup>

The proposed research strategy thus is self-conscious in creating a big intellectual stage on which project participants can operate. We hope that the inclusion of contrasting styles of inquiry will encourage an analytical breadth and methodological diversity that should enhance the rigor and subtlety of each of the project's components and thus the robustness and richness of the overall project. Since we are conceptualizing both power and value conflicts in relational terms, such breadth and diversity are likely to help rather than hinder an inquiry into how power conflict shapes values and how value conflicts shape power in world politics. We will be careful, however, not to let this diversity side-track us into a set of meta-theoretical and methodological squabbles. As project leaders, we will insist that participants focus on the issues of power and values in world politics, which frame our intellectual enterprise.

### *Empirical Analysis*

After sixty years of global leadership, the United States finds itself admired and hated, avidly emulated and violently opposed. It possesses substantial soft power: people elsewhere seek the prosperity and freedom that they see in the United States. But the United States also generates transnational forces of cultural disruption, from the stationing of soldiers abroad to the export of Christianity and commercialized sex, that affront the identities and deeply held values of other societies. Its sheer military dominance engenders resentment. And its policies, on issues such as Palestine, make it the focus of opposition for millions of people.

We seek in this project to accomplish two things: to test the observable implications of different arguments about values and power in world politics, and to uncover the causal mechanisms that generate value conflicts, often taking the form of anti-Americanism. Anti-Americanism is not a quantity that can simply be measured along one dimension. We expect to find that it has different qualitative features in different political settings. The observable implications of the three arguments that we have sketched out above need to be explored further, and they need to be theoretically refined. Uncovering the causal mechanisms that link power and value conflicts will become an important part of the empirical case studies of dyadic relations between countries at different times. Describing changes in value and power conflicts and identifying processes that generate these changes will also be part of the empirical work. In brief, this project will have both explanatory and interpretive aspirations.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>20</sup> See Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention*. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); and Robert Bates et al., *Analytic Narratives* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).

<sup>21</sup> For a discussion of the role of interpretation within the context of scientific inquiry, see King et al., *Designing Social Inquiry*, pp. 36-41.

Since we are interested in change, we need a longitudinal design, over a sufficiently long time period that permits us to identify changes both in the forces identified as potentially affecting values, and the values themselves. Our “baseline” is the period of great US dominance at the end of World War II, when the United States took the lead in constructing the international institutions that, by and large, still loom large: the United Nations, the IMF and World Bank, GATT (now the WTO) and NATO.<sup>22</sup> We will also focus on a second point of dominance, which we date at about 1963, after the Cuban Missile Crisis and before the Vietnam War. Material capabilities and military force were distributed asymmetrically both in 1945 and 1963. But patterns of values were very different in the earlier years. Secularism seemed to predominate worldwide, often taking the form of modernist nationalism, sometimes of socialism and communism. In the period between 1945 and 1963, theorists of modernity regarded “traditionalist” views such as those based on religion as destined for the ashcan of history.<sup>23</sup> Between 1963 and 2003 history has taken a different turn. What many American students of world politics thought arcane or archaic, such as the role of the Catholic Church or Islam, have had far-reaching effects on big events such as the end of the Cold War and the September 11 attack. Focusing on the period between 1945 and 2003 will enable us to examine power and value conflicts in world politics.

An historical approach will generate analytical leverage if one examines the same relationship at different points in time. All the relationships in which we are interested involve the United States, the dominant material power of the last half century and, with respect to secular values, the society from which popular cultural values are mostly “downloaded.” However, the United States is also the center of a renewed religious fervor, reflected in evangelical Protestantism, which is politically highly salient. The other countries vary in their power relationships to the United States, in the impact of globalization on their societies, and in conflicting identities that are at play in their relationships with the United States. We seek to explore how changes in power relationships, economic globalization, and conflicting identities have affected these dyadic relationships.

Tentatively, and subject to further reflection and alteration, we plan to focus on relationships between the United States and six major countries. Our case selection is designed to enable us to test for the observable implications of our three arguments (about power, globalization and identities), and to uncover the causal mechanisms that link power and value conflicts in each country dyad. While power, globalization and identities are relevant to each of the six country dyads, we expect their substantive importance to vary across dyads. To explore the role of power, we examine US relations with China and France. Analysis of US relations with Mexico and South Korea is designed to test the globalization backlash argument, and our investigation of US

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<sup>22</sup> For a discussion of this period, see G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

<sup>23</sup> Even Samuel P. Huntington, who has challenged so much conventional wisdom, in 1968 regarded modernization as unavoidable and traditional sources of authority, such as “the church,” as fated to decline. There is no entry for religion in the index of his *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). See p. 180 on the unavoidability of modernization.

relations with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is meant to help evaluate the argument about conflicting identities. Throughout our analysis, we will examine the dyadic relationships within a regional context, since to some extent, each dyad will reflect relationships and tensions between the United States and a given region of the world.

From the power-balancing perspective, one could expect sharp conflict between the United States, a dominant power, and China, a rising power. These conflicts have been intensified by the fact that the United States has actively sought to help Taiwan move toward autonomous status, if not independence, as it has become more democratic. According to the globalization backlash view, conflicts between Chinese and US elites should have decreased in recent years, while conflicts within China over globalization should have increased sharply. China has entered the World Trade Organization (WTO), its government has a strong interest in promoting international trade and investment, and the political system to date is able to manage or repress dissent. The conflicting identities argument suggests declining conflict between the United States and China over a long period of time. Until the end of the 1970s, the conflict between capitalism and communism was intense. During the last quarter-century, however, there has been some convergence. China is becoming more pluralistic and capitalistic, and it is firmly a secular society.<sup>24</sup> The United States and China exemplify “multiple modernities,” in S. N. Eisenstadt’s terminology.<sup>25</sup>

From the power-balancing standpoint, France is interesting since it has traditionally been the West European country most willing to oppose the United States, and most concerned about the transformation of the United States from superpower to “hyperpower.” If power factors are primary, France should lead opposition to US dominance. However, like China France has gained from economic globalization. From a cultural standpoint, France shares many political values with the United States, yet it understands itself as a country with a civilizational mission that diverges quite sharply from American popular culture. A close analysis of French responses to American preeminence could help sort out the extent to which power and cultural factors are driving the two countries apart, despite shared economic and security interests.

South Korea and Mexico were chosen because they have been deeply involved in processes of economic globalization. South Korea became a client state of the United States after the Korean War, successfully industrialized, then democratized. It is a secular society in which Western religions are successfully proselytizing. And it has a strong sense of nationalism – with a particular edge due to the country’s continued division. Mexico has rapidly integrated with the United States in economic terms, after being (until 1985) quite protectionist and not even a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The economic growth rates of both South Korea and

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<sup>24</sup> The two governments differ sharply on crucial issues of Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism, religious freedom and human rights. And the Chinese government is intent on blocking access (for instance, on the Internet) to the critical spirit of contemporary American society. So there are still conflicts of identity, although they seem less sharp than in the past.

<sup>25</sup> See the special issue of *Daedalus* (winter 2000) on “multiple modernities,” and Eisenstadt’s lead essay of that title. Volume 129, no. 1., of the *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*.

Mexico have been very high, although both countries have been vulnerable to financial crises. The American cultural presence has been very strong in both countries. Therefore, if the globalization backlash argument correctly identifies sources of hostility to the United States, we should see strong signs of it in both South Korea and Mexico.

Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are allies of the United States whose cultural identities conflict with dominant American values. Both countries are politically subordinate to the United States and economically dependent on relations with the West, although at very different levels of wealth. In both cases, however, tensions between the United States and oppositional movements in Islamic society have spilled over into these polities. Their elites are caught between popular antipathy against American values and their own political need for United States military and economic support. For Pakistan and Saudi Arabia the conflicting identities argument suggests increasing hostility toward the United States within the societies and resulting conflict, both internally and between these countries and the United States. The power and political economy arguments, by contrast, would lead one to predict strong, albeit asymmetrical, ties between each of these countries and the United States.

#### *Schema for a Joint Project and Edited Book*

This tentative research proposal serves as the initial intellectual scaffolding for our further work. If the project were to be approved, we would circulate this prospectus to close colleagues for further comments and revisions in the spring and summer of 2003, and hold two small workshops, one at Duke and one at Cornell, during the academic year 2003-04 to develop our ideas further and to canvass possible project participants for the Center project. In the spring and summer of 2004 we would jointly draft an essay that would serve as the initial focus for discussions. This essay could eventually form the basis for a joint project, involving other political scientists, social scientists from other disciplines, and historians.