

Too Many Chiefs: Bicameralism and the Centralization of Candidate Selection Procedures

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Abstract

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The driving force of democratic politics is competition over legislative seats and the policy influence and other perks of office that they can provide. In this competition, political parties use party labels to provide easily accessible signals about their goals, their ability to achieve those goals, the types of compromises they are likely to make in the process, and even with which other parties they are likely to form temporary or enduring coalitions (see, e.g., Bowler et al. 1999a; Raunio 1999b; Snyder and Ting 2002). Since party labels are important to parties' electoral success—even survival—it is in the interest of every party and its members to ensure that its label is clear, consistent, and competitive.

We build on the maintained hypotheses that extra-party institutions, such as legislative and constitutional rules, can affect individual legislators' abilities to affect the clarity, strength, and content of their party labels. The more opportunities individual party members have to represent the party from positions of influence like legislative offices, the more their parties' should care about who occupies those offices. In this paper we focus in particular on how legislative bicameralism creates opportunities that do not exist in unicameral systems for individuals to influence their respective party labels. In short, unlike party members in a single chamber, copartisan cohorts in separate chambers are relatively independent from each other, so that their ability (in cost-benefit terms) to express distinct positions is greater. As a result, parties have an *ex-ante* imperative to be particularly careful about who occupies these offices and who speaks for them in each chamber. We argue that this imperative should be reflected in more centralized candidate selection procedures in bicameral states versus unicameral states, as more centralized procedures allow party leaders more control over which candidates are selected.¹

¹ The centralization of candidate selection is defined by how much control voters, local and national party members, and national party leaders have over the process. We discuss this in more detail in the empirical section of the paper.

In order to provide support for our claim that there is a positive relationship between bicameralism and political party candidate selection centralization, we ran an ordered probit analysis using a dataset we created that measured the centralization of candidate selection procedures for 67 parties in 11 Western European countries from 1945 to 1990. Our preliminary results indicate that political parties in bicameral states are more likely to choose more centralized candidate selection procedures than political parties in unicameral states.

We proceed as follows. The next section briefly reviews the literature on how and to what effect institutions define decision-making structure and process. The second section starts with the twin lessons from the literature—that, first, party labels are important, and, second, dispersed decision-making authority makes it difficult to make decisions, much less to make consistent, coherent decisions over time—and builds a model to show how decisions should change as the number of decision makers increases. In this section as well we make the case that bicameralism provides a useful application for our model, which should in principle apply to any kind of offices that exist independent of any particular political party. We then build on the model to argue that candidate-selection procedures should be more centralized as legislative chambers in bicameral systems are more equal. In the third section we present our data, including an original index of bicameralism, and subject our hypothesis to empirical testing. The final section concludes.

1. Institutions and Influence

Collective action requires organization. Absent organization, collective action is difficult even in the best of worlds, where individuals share the same goals and are ready to invest resources and effort to achieving them. In more plausible contexts, where peoples' goals differ, and most if not all people would prefer to use their own resources on themselves and let others

invest in group goals, collective dilemmas multiply. Small groups succeed not despite a lack of organization, but rather because they are easy to organize, not least because each person's contribution to the group is both significant for success and observable (Olson 1965, 53-57). Large groups need organization not only to coordinate members' efforts toward group goals, but also to coordinate on the goals themselves.

Organization, by defining specific tasks or roles, differentiates members of a group from each other. Those members whose job it is to set group goals or direct the allocation of group resources wield disproportionate influence. Otherwise, any member could contest the goals as set, or the means to achieve them, and the group would spend its days in debate rather than working toward some end (cf. Cox 2006). There is thus a tradeoff between participation in decision making and the ability to make clear, consistent, timely decisions (Arrow 1951; McKelvey 1976; Shepsle and Bonchek 1997, 77; Weaver and Rockman 1993, 5-6). Indeed, when too many actors share authority over decision making, actual decisions will be few and far between (Tsebelis 1999; 2000; 2002).

In legislative settings, parties provide an obvious solution to the tension between participation and decisiveness. Parties compete for and occupy agenda-setting offices (Cox 2006) and use the authority that goes with office to direct and constrain legislative activity (Cox and McCubbins 2001; 2005), so that whatever party or group of parties controls the key legislative offices (in particular, in parliamentary systems, the Cabinet) controls policy making. The solution is incomplete, however, in that the collective dilemmas that parties solve for legislatures plague intraparty (or intracoalition) decision making as well. Moreover, a party leader who seeks to establish as party policy a position that many members reject, or that a few reject passionately,

risks revolt (Calvert 1987; and cf., e.g., *Economist* 2006; Jones 1968) or defection of members to other parties (Heller and Mershon 2005a; 2005b).

The constraints on leaders' decision-making independence are illuminating. The preferences of party members matter because they define the limits of leader autonomy. The preferences of leaders matter because, first, different leaders might set the party's position differently for different issue areas, within the range of what is acceptable to the rank and file; and second, because different leaders are likely to come up against the constraints of what is acceptable at different times and on different dimensions of policy. At its simplest, party policy making is in essence a bargaining process in which leaders set policy unilaterally but party rank and file can punish them *ex post* if they step outside of acceptable bounds. In this formulation, the process of establishing, maintaining, and implementing a party program fits in a principal-agent framework (see Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991), and the institutional game (wherein the party leader as agenda setter proposes policy that the rank and file then choose to accept or reject; Romer and Rosenthal 1978; Rosenthal 1990) is nested within the principal-agent relationship (Tsebelis 1990; and cf. Cox 1987; Cox and McCubbins 1993).

The principal-agent perspective is vital for understanding decision making within political parties, but what of parties whose leadership ranks include more than one person? Obviously, the existence of more than one leader means that no single leader can possess unilateral authority (within the constraints of leader-follower relationships) over all aspects of party policy. Authority, in other words, must be diluted, either through some bargaining process wherein leaders establish party positions by consensus (Cox and McKelvey 1984; Cox and Tutt 1984; Tsebelis 2000; 2002; and cf. Baylis 1989; Müller-Rommel 1988), or by giving each individual in the leadership unfettered authority over a relatively small policy area (Cox and

McCubbins 2005; Laver and Shepsle 1996; 1999). Party policy, where authority is thus distributed, thus is a package of leader ideal points on relevant dimensions (within the limits of the constraints of other party members; Heller 2001a).

When parties gain access to legislative agenda-setting offices, it is their leaders, not members of the rank and file, who occupy key positions. When the same people who define their party's platform exercise policy influence on behalf of that party, there will be a close correspondence between the party's formal position and its policy performance in office.² To put someone other than a leader into legislative office would be to risk blurring the party label, however, as the officeholder would naturally seek to move policy closer to his or her own ideal, and party policy as defined through action in the plenary would be different from the party platform. No party member could credibly commit to behave any other way, all else equal. Hence, as long as the party label is a valuable asset (see, e.g., Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999a; Cox and McCubbins 1994; Raunio 1999; Snyder and Ting 2002), it is in party leaders' interest directly to exercise their party's authority over legislative office, when possible, and to be very careful about whom among the rank and file they allow to exercise legislative authority otherwise (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). The main conclusion of this article is that political parties choose more centralized candidate selection procedures so that more careful decisions are made about who receives seats of influence in the legislature.

The basic lesson here is twofold. First, party labels are important, and parties seek to maintain labels that are clear, coherent, and consistent. Second, the content of decision making depends at least in part on how decisions are made. In the next section we take these lessons as

² Absent external constraints, such as the need to win elections or a danger of labor unrest, the correspondence would be complete for a party with enough seats to control all legislative decisions.

the foundation for an argument that dispersing authority can create potential problems for party labels, in particular in the case of bicameral legislatures.

2. Argument

As long as the party label matters to voters (cf., e.g., Alesina and Cukierman 1990; Cox and McCubbins 1994; Popkin 1994; Shepsle 1972), and as long as voter perceptions of party labels are linked both to electoral outcomes and to what parties do (or would do if they could) in office (c.f., Laver and Schofield 1990; Di Palma 1986; Katz 1986; Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Adams 2001; Cox and McCubbins 2005), then all party members should care how their party label is defined. As long as the party's legislative caucus can significantly influence the party's position—a reasonable supposition if the caucus can make or amend policy proposals, or issue pronouncements about and choose its voting stance on proposals exogenous to it—it will establish a party position within the caucus's Pareto set (for applications of this reasoning and its behavioral implications, see, e.g., Cox and McCubbins 2005; Krehbiel 1991).³

The definition of the party position within the Pareto set depends on party rules, which determine leadership selection and how much authority accrues to those chosen to set the party position (cf. Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Cox and McCubbins 1993; 1994; 2005; Shepsle and Bonchek 1997) and ensure that the rank and file toe the party line (Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999b). If the party controls legislative (as distinct from party) offices, officeholders also can influence at least voters' perceptions of the party position. If leaders established through party

³ It follows directly from the definition of the Pareto set that for any policy proposal x outside the Pareto set of a decisive group (that is, a group whose preferences define the winset of the status quo), there exists some policy y in the Pareto set that *all* members of the decisive group prefer to x . Hence, no rational proposer within the decisive group would propose anything outside the Pareto set. Moreover, as long as decisive groups can amend proposals, any initial proposal outside a decisive group's Pareto set would be amended to lie inside it. Hence, because any decisive group of a party is a subset of that party, its Pareto set is enclosed by or equivalent to the

procedures also occupy the party's legislative offices, then legislative institutions do not affect party positions—not because the institutions are unimportant, but rather because intraparty decision making internalizes their occupants' preferences. Party agents who hold no intraparty influence, but occupy legislative offices and are seen as representing their parties by virtue of those offices, by contrast, can through their actions and words affect how voters perceive their parties. Unless party-member preferences are very close together, this latter case makes the caucus's Pareto set not terribly binding; in other words, it leaves ample leeway for choice of party position.

This section develops the argument in two steps. First, we assume spatial preferences and show how moving from a single decision maker who acts unilaterally to two decision makers who act jointly can affect decision outcomes. The conclusion that rules affect decisions even in parties that appear to outside observers to be highly unified is essentially a strong form of the simple statement that “institutions matter.” Second, we flesh out the argument in terms of legislative bicameralism. The claim that rules matter, combined with the assumption that party members care about the clarity and content of party labels, leads directly to the hypothesis that parties' internal structure and process should take account of rules allocating authority in legislatures.

Shared authority and decision outcomes

The key difference between unilateral (albeit constrained) and shared decision making is degree of divergence in decision makers' preferences. In order to highlight the key differences between unilateral and shared decision making, we sketch the agenda-setting portion of a party-

party's Pareto set.

positioning game between decision makers and their legislative constituents.⁴ The object here is not to analyze the game of establishing the party position *per se*, but rather to delve into how the necessity of playing the game affects the party-position component of the party label and players' preferences with respect to intraparty organization and the identity of party agents.

How a party decides on its position in policy space depends on internal party politics and processes. Without some defined process for reaching and committing to decisions, it likely would be unable to set a coherent position at all. On one hand, party decisions might be unstable due to cycling (cf. McKelvey 1976) within the party. On the other hand, intraparty cycling or competing attempts by party members to mold the party's position—resulting in a decision-making bottleneck (cf. Cox 2006)—could leave the party unable to decide on any position at all. The solution in either case is hierarchy, where higher offices are endowed with greater influence over the party's agenda and, consequently, more influence over the party's policy position.

Hierarchies can be complex. To illustrate the differences between unilateral and shared decision making, we compare two relatively simple cases: a single decision maker versus two decision makers. A full game of party position setting also would incorporate party rank and file, where a rank-and-file decision to reject the leaders' proposed party position can incur disciplinary action on the part of leaders, and leadership in turn is accountable to the rank and file. For ease of exposition, however, we treat the party rank and file, or segments of it, as leaders' constituencies and assume that leaders strategically take account of rank-and-file preferences in order to avoid setting party positions that would upset their constituents (cf. Mayhew 1974). The interaction of interest is between the party leader and a party agent in

⁴ Analysis of the full party-positioning game, incorporating party rank and file as well as leaders and agents, is beyond the scope of this paper. We develop the full game in other work in progress.

legislative (as opposed to party) office, contrasted with decision making by the party leader acting alone.

When there is only one decision maker, given the assumptions noted above, there is no game. The party leader, l , proposes party position b , which in equilibrium the party caucus accepts in essence because it likes what l proposes.⁵ The leader's utility is $u_l(b) = -d_l$, where d_l is the distance from l 's ideal point x_l to b , $d_l = \|x_l - b\|$, where $\| \cdot \|$ is the Euclidean norm.⁶


If there are legislative as well as party offices to be filled, parties have to choose agents to occupy those legislative offices. Examples could include seats on important committees as well as the more obvious offices, such as committee chairs, parliamentary-group leaders, and chamber president, vice president, or secretary, not to mention (in parliamentary systems) Cabinet ministries. In a bicameral legislature, moreover, members of the upper chamber both hold seats and can take action that can affect their party label independent from their copartisans in the lower chamber. These positions are important for party position setting because those who hold them can credibly claim to represent their parties, so that what they say and do reflects on their party positions.

⁵ Note that the proposal need not maximize caucus utility. The full position-setting game is significantly more involved. We sketch it here for completeness. After the leader sets the party position, each member chooses to cooperate with the leader or to resist; resistance does not alter the position set by the leader, but it does damage the party label by some amount (and the more members who resist, the greater the damage to the label) because it makes the party's position, or the reliability of the party to defend it, or both, less clear. After the rank and file have responded to the leader's choice of party position, the leader has the option of imposing a disciplinary cost on some or all of them, but incurs a cost for applying the whip. The game ends when each party member chooses whether to seek to punish the leader (which any member might reasonably desire if she deems either the party position set by the leader to be unsatisfactory, or the discipline imposed to be too harsh, or both).

⁶ That the leader incorporates rank-and-file preferences into the party position suggests that the position probably does not maximize her own, unconstrained preferences. The leader might prefer any number of party positions to the one she establishes. She does not propose them,

Adding a party agent to the position-setting process yields the sequence shown in Figure 1. After party leader l has set the party position, the party agent, a , takes action $\alpha \in \{b_l, b_a\}$, which yields party position $b = f(b_l, b_a) \in \{[b_l, b_a) : \nexists x \neq b \text{ s.t. } u_j(b) > u_j(x) \forall j = l, a\}$ —in words, on the $b_l - b_a$ contract curve. In the full game outlined in note 5, each party member then would respond to b rather than b_l . To keep the setup simple, even in the full game a is neither subject to punishment at the leader-punishment stage, nor subject to l 's discipline.⁷ Any public divergence between b_l and α not only moves the party position from b_l , but also damages voter confidence in the reliability of the party label by $\gamma \|b_l - \alpha\|$. The greater the divergence, the greater the damage to the party label. The payoffs to party leader and agent in the shared decision making case thus are, respectively, $u_l(b) = -d_l - \gamma \|b_l - \alpha\|$ and $u_a(b) = -d_a - \gamma \|b_l - \alpha\|$.

Figure 1: Setting Party Policy, Two Decision Makers



The key differences between single-leader party-position setting and shared party-position setting by a leader and an agent are two. Most obviously, the two-player case includes a payoff to player a , who is absent from the single-player case. The second difference is in the addition of the $\gamma \|b_l - \alpha\|$ term to the leader's payoff. As noted, full analysis of this game is

however, because doing so would provoke a backlash or sanctions such that the outcome overall is worse for her than an initial proposal more amenable to the rank and file.

⁷ Making the agent immune from punishment is a strong assumption. It is not unreasonable, however. Just as a government can survive votes of confidence with outside support in the face of defection of some coalition partner, a chamber president can serve a different majority than the government, as was often the case in Italy from the early 1970s to the mid 1990s. In a bicameral legislature, of course, members of one chamber are not normally subject to punishment by members of the other.

beyond the scope of this paper; of interest here is a) how the addition of a second player with agenda influence affects the party label as well as l 's initial efforts to set the party position, and b) the extent to which both leader and agent might benefit from adjusting internal *party* rules to take account of a 's *legislative* position. Hence, it is sufficient to truncate the game to l 's initial proposal of b_l and a 's decision either to reiterate b_l , or amend the party position by proposing b_a .

Assuming full information and proceeding by backward induction, the party agent's decision to accept or amend the party position as established by the party leader depends on how his choice affects his payoffs. Responses of the party rank and file are not considered here, as they would affect the outcome of the game, but not the logic underpinning it. The party leader, in turn, will attempt to structure a 's action through her choice of b_l . The party agent will amend the party position by proposing b_a if doing so moves the party position far enough toward his own ideal point to offset (for his own benefit) the party-label costs he incurs by diverging from l 's offer. Formally, a offers b_a as long as $\|x_a - b_l\| > \gamma \|b_l - b_a\| + \|x_a - b_l\|$. To do otherwise would imply accepting a worse outcome than could be achieved unilaterally by amending b_l .

If the agent amends the party position, he also imposes a party-label cost on everyone in the party. Given the prospect of what a can do, it behooves the party leader to set b_l such that a is better off not amending it—i.e., $\|x_a - b_l\| \leq \gamma \|b_l - b_a\| + \|x_a - b_l\|$ —and $u_l(b_l) \geq u_l(b)$. Such a strategic initial offer leaves the party position no worse for the leader than if a had amended it (cf. Baron and Ferejohn 1989a; 1989b), but everybody in the party is better off because there is no damage to the party label due to divergence between party leader and party agent.

The truncated position-setting game sketched above leads to two principal conclusions. First, the obvious implication that the position a party would take if it had a single leader is likely to be different from the position it would take with two (or possibly more) decision makers.⁸ Second and related, the existence of a party agent who can influence his party's position constrains the party leader. A leader who attempts to stake out a party position too far from the agent's ideal point will end up with an amended position between her proposed position and the agent's ideal point. Moreover, the process of amending the party position damages the party label. Consequently, the leader (and everyone else in the party) would be better off if she set the party position close enough to the agent's ideal point to make it unattractive for him to amend it. The logic is that of the Romer–Rosenthal setter model, but here rejection of the initial proposal leads not to the reversion, but rather to a modified party position. (The logic is the same as when a legislature considers a committee proposal under an open, as opposed to a closed, rule; cf. Krehbiel 1997; 1991). The observation in all cases, as long as the party label is valuable and all players know each others' preferences, is that the leader sets the party position, and the rest of the party supports it. Party leaders and agents should disagree publicly only if they are mistaken about each other's preferences, or if the value of the party label is relatively low.

If the value of the party label is high, as we have assumed in line with the conventional wisdom, then the cost of disagreement could be quite high. A party in a position to control extra-party offices thus would benefit either from inducing party agents to internalize party preferences as defined by intraparty decision making, or from internalizing the preferences of party agents in

⁸ Adding a decision maker would make no difference in only two situations: On one hand, the party position and label would be unchanged if decision makers' ideal points were close together relative to the cost of public disagreement. On the other hand, adding multiple agents whose amendments offset each other also would result in no change: amendments to the party position ultimately would be unsuccessful, but damaging to the party label, leaving strategic rational agents better off accepting the position set initially by the party leader. This circumstance is unlikely to occur by chance. If neither condition obtains, a strategic leader will set the party position different from where she would put it in the absence of party agents, and no party agent will amend it.

extra-party offices by giving them influence in setting the party position from the outset. The latter strategy implies that intraparty decision making should involve more actors in parties that are well-positioned to control legislative (or government) office. The former strategy, which we explore here, essentially amounts to giving party leaders a great deal of control over their rank-and-file members' fates.

Bicameralism and party labels

Bicameralism provides an institutionally “pure” case of shared legislative decision making. On one hand, members of one chamber—or of some central party organization—generally have little immediate ability to punish or reward the behavior of their counterparts in the other chamber. Unlike party representatives on legislative committees, for instance, who can be replaced or demoted by their legislative party for failing to toe the party line, members of one legislative chamber or the other usually hold their seats for the duration of the legislature. On the other hand, the place of each chamber in the legislative process is constitutionally defined and not subject to the judgment of any individual or group in the legislature or government.⁹ From the perspective of a party caucus in one chamber, their copartisans in the other chamber are analogous to the party agent described above: what they say and do can affect the party's policy position and overall label, whether or not the party has any influence on policy outcomes.

The problem for parties is that their cohorts in different chambers can define different positions. If party members value the clarity of party labels, they should seek to avoid public disagreements between party cohorts across chambers. They might, for example, seek to establish a common party position through extraparliamentary, intraparty bargaining (cf. Evans 2001; Evans and Oleszek 2001a; 2001b). To the casual observer, in other words, bicameralism

should appear to matter for policy outcomes only when chamber majorities differ. Party positions would differ from what they would be in a unicameral system, but the assertion is in the realm of counterfactuals. For party leaders whose goals include specific policy objectives, however, the existence of a second chamber raises the possibility that some party members might gain more influence than their rank within the party merits, or that some party leaders might expand their influence beyond the vetoes they normally would wield (cf. Cox and McCubbins 2005).

The key point is that it matters which members of a party have seats in each chamber. If the overall position of a party derives from the positions taken by its contingents in each chamber, any member who can influence her party's position in one chamber can influence her party's position overall. For party leaders and activists, the potential influence with which bicameralism imbues party rank and file can be an opportunity or a constraint. It is a constraint if the distribution of members across chambers hinders leaders or activists from defining the party ideal point as they would like. It is an opportunity if the distribution of members yields a set of feasible party positions close to what leaders or activists want. In either circumstance, dividing the party across chambers changes the nature of intraparty bargaining; in order to reduce the extent to which competing copartisanship in different chambers constrain them, party leaders need to keep a careful eye on which party members have access to each chamber.

Candidate Selection Procedures

Political parties have two options when they are devising rules about how much influence they will have over candidate selection: they can change electoral or constitutional rules, or they can change party rules. Changing electoral or constitutional rules should be harder to do because

⁹ Contrast each chamber's constitutional role with the role of legislative committees, where legislative leadership decides which (if any) committee or committees consider any given bill.

they have to get members of other parties or a potential supermajority of voters to agree.¹⁰

Changing party rules, on the other hand, should be easier at the very least because party members agree on the importance of having their party do well at the ballot box. It is reasonable, therefore, to expect parties to adapt to their political and institutional context by changing party rules (e.g., for selecting candidates) before seeking to change higher-level rules.

It has long been recognized that parties' candidate-selection rules have important implications for the conduct and content of politics. As Gallagher (1988, 1-2) put it, "through recruitment, the party indirectly influences... the interests most likely to be heard." Further, centralized selection procedures help induce self-interested to toe the party line. They do so to stay on the good side of party leaders who control prospects in future elections. Party discipline should be looser, by contrast, in the absence of clear control over legislators' future electoral chances (Gallagher 1988, 15; see also Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999a; 1999b). In Belgium, for example, decentralized candidate-selection mechanisms prior to the 1960s led to party factionalization, and the institution of more centralized procedures went hand in hand with increased party discipline (De Winter 1988). We take this reasoning a step further and examine the relationship between institutions and candidate selection procedures. We hypothesize that in light of the opportunity upper chambers provide for party members to alter party labels, parties will seek to control the selection of candidates to each chamber, thus making the party cohorts in each chamber agents of the party as a whole (cf. Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, ch. 2). In contrast, since parties in unicameral legislatures do not have to worry about the selection of members into an upper chamber, they should evince less concern about the centralization of candidate selection. We test this hypothesis in the next section.

¹⁰ A majority party could in most cases change electoral rules unilaterally. However, in most cases a party that gains majority control under a given set of rules is unlikely to want to tamper with those rules, all else constant (Boix

3. The Real World: Data and Test

Candidate-Selection Centralization

In order to examine the centralization of candidate selection procedures, we constructed a database of candidate selection procedures across space and time. Building on pioneering work by Janda (1979; 1980) that identifies parties' candidate-selection procedures in democratic as well as non-democratic regimes, we developed a candidate-selection centralization scale. For the purposes of this paper, the centralization of candidate selection is defined by how much control voters, local and national party members, and national party leaders have over the process. In general, less-centralized procedures in our scale allow more participation by voters and local-level party leaders in deciding on a party's candidates. A fully centralized procedure, by contrast would allow neither voters nor local party leaders any influence in the process.

Table 1 shows our centralization scale. The most decentralized processes (coded as one) are cases where no rules for selection exist—in other words, the party has no control over who runs under its label. To the extent that the process is free of direct voter influence, the value of the selection procedure increases along the scale. The most centralized procedure on the scale is cases where the executive of the party choose the candidates with no input from voters or other party members (coded as nine).

Table 1: Coding for Centralization of Party Candidate Selection Procedures

Code	Criterion
1	There are no criteria for selecting candidates.
2	Nominations are determined locally by vote of party members and ratified by local leaders.
3	Selection is made by local party leaders and must then be ratified in some way by local party members.
4	Selection is made by local leaders with little or no participation by no other party members.
5	Selection is made locally by party members or leaders and must be approved by the national organization.

1999).

6	Selection is made is made by local leaders only and must be approved by the national organization.
7	Selection is made by the national organization, but selections must be approved by local or affiliated organizations.
8	Selection is made by a national party congress or caucus. This decision may or may not be approved by the national executive.
9	Selection is made by an executive party council.

As an information source on candidate selection procedures, we used data from Katz and Mair (1992), who catalogued party rules throughout western democracies from the mid-1940s through the early 1990s. The unit of analysis was party-year. We were able to code candidate selection centralization for 1948 observations on 67 political parties in 11 Western democracies (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) from, for the most complete cases, 1945 to 1990.

Seven parties were coded as one: the Belgian Flemish Socialist Party in from 1963 to 1978, the Flemish Socialist Party from 1979-1989, the Belgian Socialist Parties from 1979-1989, the Belgian Liberal Reform Party from 1960-1961, the Belgian People’s Union from 1961-1966, the Social-Liberal Party in Denmark from 1962 to 1970, and the Progress Party in Denmark from 1974 to 1990. Only one party—the Dutch Communist Party in 1973-1989—received the highest value on the candidate-selection centralization scale. The data are skewed to the right, with 6 being the modal category and 5 coming in a close second. To put it simply, most parties’ procedures allow local party leaders or voters to propose candidates, and the national party then can either accept or reject the proposals.

As can be seen in Figures 2 and 3, a simple examination the distribution of our dependent variable, the centralization of candidate selection procedures, in unicameral and bicameral states, supports the hypothesis that bicameralism induces parties to adopt more centralized candidate-selection procedures. Substantively, these histograms show that local party members and local

party leaders tend to control candidate selection in unicameral systems (the modal category is 5, with many observations below the mode and only a few observations above it), as opposed to bicameral systems, where local and national party leaders control the process and local members' involvement is limited (the modal category for bicameral systems is 6, with a distribution that is closer to a normal distribution of non-modal observations).

Figure 2: Candidate-Selection Centralization, Unicameral Systems





Figure 3: Candidate-Selection Centralization, Bicameral Systems



Statistical Models

We ran four models. In the first two models, we used a simple bicameral dummy variable as our key independent variable. In the second two models, we chose to code our key right-hand-side variable as an index. While our basic hypothesis that candidate selection procedures should be more centralized in bicameral systems than unicameral ones permits a simple bivariate measure of bicameralism, the hypothesis is in fact more nuanced. Basically, we are arguing that the more powerful is an upper chamber—that is, the more it can affect policy, and the more people are likely to pay attention to its members—the more centralized should parties' candidate-selection procedures be. We therefore construct an index of bicameralism, ranging from 0 (there is no upper chamber) to 1 (the upper chamber is coequal—or very nearly so—with the lower chamber). All unicameral systems are coded 0 on the bicameralism index; among bicameral systems in our data, only Italy rates a 1.

We construct the index as follows. First, we consulted national constitutions (and secondary sources where necessary) to answer a series of questions about each chamber's powers (see Appendix). We then coded answers to these questions as 1 (for "yes") or 0 (for "no"). In each category of questions,¹³ we calculated a statistic with low values where upper-chamber authority is low relative to that of the lower chamber and high values where the upper chamber's authority equals or exceeds that of the lower chamber.¹⁴ To reflect this, we calculated the selection-rule statistic as 0 if both chambers have the same selection rule and 1 if selection rules are distinct; where selection rules differ partially, e.g., where both chambers are selected by proportional representation, but the upper chamber has appointed members or life members as well, the statistic is .5. Finally, we summed the calculated statistics for each category and divided the result by the maximum score, yielding the index shown in Table 2.

Table 2: Bicameralism Index

Country	Period	Bicameralism index
Austria	1975-1987	0.48
Austria	1988-1990	0.46
Belgium	1960-1990	0.67
Germany	1960-1968	0.64
Germany	1969-1990	0.67
Ireland	1960-1990	0.45
Italy	1960-1990	1
Netherlands	1960-1983	0.76
Netherlands	1984-1990	0.81
Norway	1960-1990	0.65
UK	1960-1990	0.52

¹³ Categories include, for example, chamber powers with respect to budget bills; chamber powers with respect to votes of confidence; selection/election rules for each chamber; and so on. With respect to selection rules, we take seriously Lijphart's (1984; McCarty and Cutrone 2006) claim that congruent chamber composition, which is more likely when members of both chambers are selected by the same method, renders the upper chamber essentially redundant (but see Heller 2001b; 2007).

¹⁴ In Belgium, for example, the upper chamber can nominate judges, a power not shared by the lower chamber.

Putting it all together

In order to test the hypothesis that that parties in bicameral systems should have more centralized candidate-selection procedures than parties in unicameral systems, all else equal, we look at centralization as a function of bicameralism. Our dependent variable thus is the centralization of a party's candidate selection procedure in a given year. Given that our centralization scaling is ordinal, we test the relationship using an ordered probit.

As noted, the independent variable of interest is *Bicameralism*, coded as described above. Because we argue that parties in bicameral states should centralize candidate selection in order to ensure that they can either properly screen or properly control (or both) candidates for both chambers, in order to ensure that they do not use their legislative positions to dilute the party label, we expect the coefficient for *Bicameralism* to be positive.

The Usual Suspects

There are of course other factors that affect parties' candidate-selection procedures. In order to make sure that our results are robust to arguments found in the literature, we identify a number of factors thought to affect candidate-selection centralization. The most obvious factor is constitutional or legal constraints or requirements (Gallagher 1988). Three countries in our data—Finland, Norway, and the former West Germany (Gallagher 1988, 257)—have constitutional or other legal constraints on candidate selection. Parties in these countries have no choice but to establish decentralized candidate selection. We include a dummy variable in our analysis, *ConstitLegRestrictions* (equal to 1 if restrictions exist and 0 otherwise), to control for such restrictions. We expect the coefficient of *ConstitLegRestrictions* to be negative.

Other institutional factors that have been identified as affecting a party's choice of a candidate selection mechanism are unitary versus federal arrangements and proportion representation electoral rules versus single member district rules. It has been argued that parties

should be more decentralized in federal than unitary systems, because federal parties need to establish strong local branches in order to coordinate across subnational units (Bowler, Farrell, and Katz 1999a; 1999b; Gallagher 1988; Gallagher and Marsh 1988). Note, however, that the logic of our argument with respect to bicameralism suggests just the opposite. That is, the need for coordination across federal units should motivate parties to centralize control over national legislators in order to ensure that they project a common message and party label. Similar reasoning suggests that parties should be more centralized where elections are conducted under proportional representation rules, because of the need to establish coherent party lists. We are agnostic on this point.

We control for these institutional factors with two dummy variables, *Federal* (1 for federal systems, 0 for unitary systems) and *ElectoralSystem* (coded 1 for PR systems and 0 for SMD systems). The arguments found in the literature for controlling for these factors suggest that the coefficient for *Federal* should be negative, and the coefficient for *ElectoralSystem* should be positive. We reiterate, however, that our logic suggests that the coefficient for *Federal* should be positive and gives no basis for expecting either a positive or a negative coefficient for *ElectoralSystem*. (We coded both of these variables on the basis of data from Lijphart 1999.)

Finally, Tan (2000) suggests that party size could affect the centralization of party candidate selection procedures. The larger a party, the harder it should be to control its members, all else constant, due to the likelihood of increased diversity among party members and the multiplication of potential collective dilemmas with the party. To compensate, larger parties should adopt more centralized candidate-selection procedures in order to maintain the purity and clarity of the party label. Of course, there might be decreasing marginal returns from increased centralization, suggesting a log-linear relationship (Tan 2000). We control for party size using

membership data from Katz and Mair (1992) to construct a *PartySize* variable. We expect the coefficient of *PartySize* to be positive.

Results

We tested our hypothesis that bicameralism should induce parties to adopt centralized candidate-selection procedures by running an ordered probit with our candidate-selection procedure scale as the dependent variable. Once again, the unit of analysis was party-year. The results are displayed in Table 3. Models 1 and 2 include the simple bicameralism dummy and Models 3 and 4 include the bicameralism index displayed in Table 2. Models 1 and 3 show the results without the benefit of our control variables, and models 2 and 4 show the results with the control variables included. In all cases, the coefficient for Bicameralism is strong, statistically significant, and in the expected direction. Substantively, these results suggest that party candidate-selection procedures will be higher on our centralization scale in bicameral systems than in unicameral ones.

The coefficients for the control variables in models 2 and 4 are less illuminating. Even though the coefficient for *ConstitLegRestrictions* is significant and in the right direction in Model 3, it is surprisingly indistinguishable from zero in Model 4. The results for *Federal* and *Electoral* also are mixed. As we have noted, the literature suggests that we should expect *Electoral* to take a positive coefficient, as it does when the independent variable of interest is our Bicameralism index. When we use the bicameralism dummy instead, however, the coefficient *Electoral* is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The coefficient for *Federal*, by contrast, is positive when the bicameralism index is used, and significant and negative—in line with conventional wisdom, but against our reasoning—in Model 4, using the bivariate coding of

Bicameralism. The log of party size (*sizelog*) is statistically significant, but negative, against expectations.

Table 3: Bicameralism and Candidate-Selection Centralization

Dependent variable: Candidate Centralization (Standard errors in parentheses)				
	<i>Bicameralism</i> =Bicameralism dummy		<i>Bicameralism</i> =Bicameralism index	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Bicameralism	1.098*** (0.064)	1.200*** (0.071)	1.333*** (0.076)	1.357*** (0.079)
Restrictions		-0.191*** (0.056)		-0.005 (0.056)
Electoral		-0.169 (0.160)		0.356* (0.159)
Federal		-0.168*** (0.054)		0.130** (0.050)
Size_{log}		-0.024* (0.133)		-0.036** (0.134)
cut1	-0.993 (0.068)	-1.314 (0.158)	-1.102 (0.064)	-1.443 (0.157)
cut2	-0.121 (0.058)	-0.443 (0.155)	-0.222 (0.053)	-0.564 (0.154)
cut3	-0.061 (0.058)	-0.382 (0.155)	-0.161 (0.052)	-0.501 (0.154)
cut4	0.185 (0.058)	-0.136 (0.155)	0.084 (0.052)	-0.251 (0.154)
cut5	0.897 (0.061)	0.587 (0.154)	0.795 (0.055)	0.474 (0.153)
cut6	1.69 (0.066)	1.387 (0.156)	1.599 (0.060)	1.280 (0.155)
cut7	2.33 (0.072)	2.023 (0.159)	2.234 (0.066)	1.909 (0.157)
cut8	3.41 (0.109)	3.110 (0.176)	3.314 (0.106)	2.991 (0.175)
N	1948	1948	1948	1948
Prob.> Chi2	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Pseudo R ²	0.0413	0.0441	0.0431	0.0455

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$

4. Conclusion

- We have shown a relationship between bicameralism and party organization
 - The relationship is predicted by asking not just how institutions affect outcomes, but also how they affect incentives—and how policy-motivated actors might respond
- The argument should apply to other constitutional and legislative structures
 - Parties in the EU, party factions, etc.
- One of the main problems with the empirical analysis of institutions is that in equilibrium their direct effects should be invisible.
 - Comparative analysis over both time and space, however, gives leverage to examine a different kind of effect—that is, how players adapt to rules they cannot change
 - The effects are important
 - How parties organize affects how they make decisions, which affects their positions, how voters perceive them, party systems
 - These effects are indirect
- The moral of the story is that it is important to examine institutions in context—not just cultural and historical context, but in terms of what other institutions exist and might affect how actors empowered or constrained by one institution or set of institutions go about trying to achieve their goals.

Appendix

In order to create our bicameralism index, we sought information on chambers—“yes” or “no” answers to a series of questions about the authorities of each legislative chamber, as well as the broad outlines of rules governing allocation of chamber seats—in constitutions and secondary sources. We collected data by country year for the following questions.

Electoral Rules

1. How many chambers are there?
2. How is the lower chamber selected?
 - a. PR
 - b. SMD
 - c. Both
 - d. Indirect Selection
3. How is the upper chamber selected?
 - a. PR
 - b. SMD
 - c. Both
 - d. Indirect Selection

Significance of Chambers

4. Who can request extraordinary sessions?
 - a. Lower Chamber
 - b. Upper Chamber
 - c. Both
 - d. Neither
5. Who has the power to introduce non-budget bills?
 - a. Lower Chamber
 - i. Can the upper chamber veto? Yes
 1. Can the lower chamber override the veto? Yes
 - b. Upper Chamber
 - i. Can the lower chamber veto?
 1. Can the upper chamber override the veto?
 - c. Both
 - i. Can the upper chamber veto?
 1. Can the lower chamber override the veto?
 - ii. Can the lower chamber veto?
 1. Can the upper chamber override the veto?
 - d. Neither
6. Who has the power to introduce budget bills?
 - a. Lower Chamber
 - i. Can the upper chamber veto?
 1. Can the lower chamber override the veto?
 - b. Upper Chamber

- i. Can the lower chamber veto?
 - 1. Can the upper chamber override the veto?
 - c. Both
 - i. Can the upper chamber veto?
 - 1. Can the lower chamber override the veto?
 - ii. Can the lower chamber veto?
 - 1. Can the upper chamber override the veto?
 - d. Neither, but can veto
 - i. Can the upper chamber veto?
 - 1. Can the lower chamber override the veto?
 - ii. Can the lower chamber veto?
 - 1. Can the upper chamber override the veto?
 - e. Neither
- 7. Can the executive veto...
 - a. Lower Chamber non-budget bills
 - b. Upper chamber non-budget bills
 - c. Lower Chamber budget bills
 - d. Upper Chamber budget bills
 - e. Neither
 - f. Both Chambers non-budget bills
 - g. Both Chambers budget bills
- 8. Who have the power to vote for war?
 - a. Lower Chamber
 - b. Upper Chamber
 - c. Both
 - d. Neither
- 9. Who has the power to vote for treaties with other countries?
 - a. Lower Chamber
 - b. Upper Chamber
 - c. Both
 - d. Neither
- 10. Who has the power to vote on introducing and/or approving constitutional changes?
 - a. Lower Chamber
 - b. Upper Chamber
 - c. Both
 - d. Neither
- 11. Who has the power to investigate state officials?
 - a. Lower Chamber
 - b. Upper Chamber
 - c. Both
 - d. Neither
- 12. Who is able to select the executive?

- a. Lower Chamber
 - b. Upper Chamber
 - c. Both
 - d. Neither
13. Who has the power to remove confidence from the Government?
- a. Lower Chamber
 - b. Upper Chamber
 - c. Both
 - d. Neither
14. Who has the power to impeach the executive?
- a. Lower Chamber
 - b. Upper Chamber
 - c. Both
 - d. Neither
15. Who has the power to propose candidates for national courts?
- a. Lower Chamber
 - b. Upper Chamber
 - c. Both
 - d. Neither
16. Can the lower chamber create its own procedural rules?
17. Can the upper chamber create its own procedural rules?
18. Can the lower chamber create its own organizational rules?
19. Can the upper chamber create its own organizational rules?

Autonomy of Chambers

- 20. Can the lower chamber dissolve the upper chamber?
- 21. Can the upper chamber dissolve the lower chamber?
- 22. Can the lower chamber be dissolved by the executive?
- 23. Can the upper chamber be dissolved by the executive?
- 24. Can the lower chamber dissolve itself?
- 25. Can the upper chamber dissolve itself?

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