

**Bicameralism and Institutional Sensitivity to Party Change
in the U.S. Congress, 1900-2006**

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Abstract

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Abstract: We present evidence that moderates began to emerge in Congress during the 1920s and 1930s. Beginning in the 1940s, Democratic moderates in both chambers of the U.S. Congress began a steady decline leading to their virtual disappearance by the 1990s. Although the timing is a bit different for Republicans, the same basic pattern of emergence and then decline has ensued. Although the House and the Senate are marked by significant differences in both internal rules and electoral processes, the similar pattern across chambers leads us to argue that the cause of the decline in the number of moderates lies in the broader context of party competition. We argue that the emergence of moderates in both parties reflects the reaction to a shifting regional party composition and the emergence of a “new” agenda by the “older” elements within each party. Their decline reflects the consequences of a prolonged realignment of the parties.

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The U.S. Constitution created a bicameral legislature consisting of two independent legislative bodies designed to represent different interests and foster deliberative lawmaking. Elections send representatives to Congress who reflect policy preferences of ordinary citizens in the districts and states that chose them. But the institution of bicameralism should lead to differences in how quickly changes in the issues on the electoral agenda will be reflected in the behavior of Representatives and Senators. The House with members directly elected for short two-year terms to represent a relatively small number of constituents should respond quickly to new issues that show up on the political agenda. Senators selected (originally by state legislatures) to represent states, and serving staggered, six-year terms are more insulated from popular pressures, so the Senate as an institution should respond more slowly to new issues.

The nature and timing of institutional responsiveness are reflected in changes in the distribution of members' ideology within party caucuses along a left/right (liberal/conservative) continuum. Because such changes occur sporadically and play out over a series of elections, we need to look at a long time period. In this paper, we analyze changes in the ideological distribution in House and Senate party caucuses from 1876 to the present. While this time period is long enough to allow us to observe the relevant changes, the meaning of left/right (or liberal/conservative) as we understand such terms in the post-New Deal period may not be the same in the early 20th century. We cannot resolve this problem in this paper, so we propose to finesse it by focusing on a part of the ideological spectrum that always has the same meaning—moderates. Moderates, by definition, are in the middle of the distribution. Even if the substantive interpretation of the end points changes over time, moderates always occupy a position between those end points whatever they might mean.

Thus, we analyze the rise and decline of moderates in Congress from the end of Reconstruction to the present. Despite the institutional differences arising from bicameralism, we find evidence that trends in the prominence of moderates in Congress over the last century trace remarkably similar paths in the House and Senate. There are regional and party differences, but the patterns within each party are also quite similar in both chambers. The overall pattern is that Democratic moderates came disproportionately from the South and Border States. Their numbers started to increase sharply in the early 1920s, reaching a zenith in the 1940s. Since then, there has been relatively steady decline and they all but disappeared by the 1990s. Republican moderates came disproportionately from the Northeast and Midwest. As we observed for Democrats, the proportion of Republican moderates started to increase in the 1920s. But the rise was much slower, and did not peak until the 1970s, at which point there was steady decline. Republican moderates also had largely disappeared by the 1990s. We seek to explain these patterns.

We consider two possible explanations. First, moderates may simply reflect changes in voting patterns in House districts and states. The voters in certain districts and states may have moved from solid support of one party or the other to competitive elections and then back to strong support for one party. As constituencies become more competitive, we might see an increase in moderates because members with a middle-of-the-road record are more successful at winning in territory where the other party is competitive. Second, it may be that the agenda changed, creating internal tensions and disagreements. These tensions reflected regional policy differences, especially among Democrats, with one wing of the party rejecting the policy preferences of the other. The “older” wings of each party became the moderates of the party. To examine this, we look at changes in the policy agenda and party realignments that changed electoral politics in the different regions to try to explain moderates’ rise and decline.

The plan of the paper is as follows. We begin with our definition of moderates. Next we track the presence of moderates over time to show when they emerged and then declined, and what regions were sending moderates to Congress. We then examine two possible explanations of change, focusing primarily on the second possibility sketched out above. We then discuss the shifting agendas of the parties and track how the changes played out regionally.

Moderates in American Politics

The significance of moderates in American politics has been closely connected to our interpretation of political parties. In the post-New Deal era American political parties were uniformly seen as broad, ideologically heterogeneous organizations that brought together various voting blocs with the aim of winning elections. For decades the two major parties were seen as moderate, centrist parties more concerned with winning elections than with promoting a coherent party policy agenda. The parties did advocate different policies, but the disagreement was over details rather than over fundamental principles of class, religion, or ideology. The parties in American politics don't compete to win elections in order to enact a party program. Instead, the parties advocated policies that would appeal to voters in order to win elections. And to win elections, both major parties tolerated a large range of policy preferences among their elected representatives. Thus, the two major parties were pragmatic rather than doctrinaire and they compromised or changed their policy positions if necessary to win.

Within this party system, moderates played a significant role in affecting the degree of political conflict in Congress and the tone of American politics. When the number of moderates is high, party members on both sides know they must work with those with more moderate views to build a majority to pass legislation. That in turn reduces the inclination to adopt hostile stances versus those who differ. Compromise and restraint of language become more important. It is not just the style and tone of politics that has made moderates important. American society has always been diverse, and

moderates are seen as a natural expression of that diversity. The logic of federalism is that the House (and the Senate) will reflect the diverse needs and views of our society. Mass political parties formed to solve collective action problems of mobilizing a diverse electorate in order to win elections. It was ambition for national office that attracted politicians and the “spoils” of office bound them together and helped mobilize voters. Within each state, the political parties organized a coalition of interests to appeal to voters in that particular state (Aldrich 1995; Schlesinger 1991). The state party organizations would come together under a common label once every four years to nominate and elect the president, but the diversity of interests in winning electoral coalitions across the states and regions meant that there was no national party consensus on a policy agenda. Members bring their diverse, parochial perspectives to deliberations in each party caucus. Consequently, party cohesion and discipline is weak and cross-party coalitions are common (Aldrich, Berger and Rohde 2002; Cooper and Young 2002). The presence of members in Congress whose voting record made them less loyal to their party exerted a significant impact on congressional decisions and made them pivotal members in the legislative process (Krehbiel 1998). Majority party leaders unable to control the behavior of their members acted more as facilitators than wielders of partisan power (Cooper and Brady 1981; Rohde 1991).

For much of the second half of the 20th century these virtues played out because the parties in Congress were ideologically diverse. Most members of the party fit comfortably into the mainstream of their party caucus, but some, labeled as “moderates,” held views that were less extreme than those of their fellow partisans. Ideologically heterogeneous parties created considerable uncertainty in congressional policymaking. The presence of less partisan members of the majority gave hope to the minority party that a bipartisan, ideologically homogeneous coalition could form to control public policy.

For members of the majority party, however, the uncertainty was a recurring source of frustration. The diversity within the party lessened the likelihood that majority partisans would vote to strengthen the hand of party leaders to compel support for a party agenda that might be unpopular back home (Rohde 1991). Reflecting the decentralized nature of the legislative process and the rules that served to protect members who had accumulated seniority in the institution, many moderates rose to positions of considerable power and leverage in Congress. Moderates in Congress exerted a significant impact on congressional decisions because they were frequently pivotal members in the legislative process (Krehbiel 1998). The ability of the majority party to govern, therefore, was severely limited.

The heterogeneous nature of the parties means that the national parties are unlikely to be able to forge compromises that will unite all factions of the party around a coherent set of policy stands. Rather, the primary point of agreement is on a presidential candidate who can attract support from both liberal and conservative interests in most sections of the country. The emphasis on winning elections shifts conflict over policy to the legislative arena. Consequently, party unity in Congress is low because the “differences within the party tend to be as great as or even greater than differences between parties” (Key 1942, 260, 500-501). In short, for quite some time the portrait of parties has been that diversity is fundamental and enduring within each party. Each contained wings that disagreed with others. Coalitions formed across party lines over diverse issues. In the world of weak, heterogeneous political parties, moderates were often the “power brokers” able to deliver their support to either the majority or minority party.

The Rise and Decline of Moderates over Time

The first matter to examine regarding moderates is how their presence in Congress varies over time. Until recently, moderates had a substantial presence in both party caucuses in Congress. The precipitous decline of moderates in Congress in recent years is well documented (Fleisher and Bond

2004, 2005; Theriault 2003, 2006). Since much of what we know about moderates in Congress is based on observations of American politics after the New Deal, their recent demise appears to reflect something new. As we will show, the presence of a large number of moderates is not a typical, enduring feature of the House, but instead is a phenomenon limited primarily to the mid-20th century. If there is variation in presence of moderates, the second issue is what has created variation. Before assessing possible explanations, we need to define “moderates” and look at how their numbers have varied over time.

Defining Moderates

Defining who is moderate and who is not is to a large extent arbitrary. It involves selecting a point at which a member’s voting record is sufficiently different from the base party voting pattern that it can be classified as divergent. Because our interest is in institutional change, we wish to capture two elements of moderation: (1) members regarded as moderate because their preferences fall roughly midway between the end-points of an ideological continuum, and (2) members who diverge so far that they are closer to the opposing party than to their declared party. The concept of “moderate” typically refers to the first element—a member whose ideological voting record falls between the bases of each political party. All but a handful of the individuals we define as moderates have centrists, middle-of-the-road voting records. But a small number of party members have had ideological views closer to the mainstream of the other party than to their own—i.e., conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans. Although members of this latter type are not in the center of the ideological continuum, the presence of such extreme misfits in a party caucus can be a moderating influence because the party mainstream often has to adjust party positions to attract their support. Together these members differ from their party’s mean voting pattern enough to create pressures to moderate the party stance. We refer to these two groups as moderates (Fleisher and Bond 2004, 433-435).

We use Poole and Rosenthal's DW-NOMINATE scores to track the presence of moderates within each of the congressional parties. Democratic moderates are defined as members whose DW-NOMINATE scores were greater than $-.20$; Republican moderates are members with ideology scores less than $.20$. Defining the partisan moderates in this manner brings into the group members whose views are moderate relative to their fellow partisans as well as members of the party whose ideological positions are actually closer to the core of the opposition party (i.e., liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats).¹

Figure 1 shows that moderates were not common in either party during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Beginning in the late 1910s and early 1920s, the presence of moderates in both chambers began to grow. The patterns are strikingly similar in both chambers, but we do see some party differences. The proportion of Democratic moderates in both chambers started to rise sharply in the 1920s, peaking in the 1940s, and then followed by a steady decline through the 2000s. The presence of Republican moderates in both the House and Senate also started to increase early in the 20th century, but the rise is more gradual and did not peak until the 1970s.

[Figure 1 about here]

The view of moderates and the composition of the parties in the post-New Deal period are relatively well understood. The so-called "conservative coalition" of Southern Democrats and Republicans emerged in the late New Deal, and exerted considerable influence in Congress until the 1980s (Brady and Bullock 1980; Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1993, 87-88; Manley 1973; Shelley 1983). Since that time, each of the parties has become more ideologically homogeneous, regional differences

¹ There are only a small number of members defined as "moderates" in our study who were beyond the $.2$ cut point on the other party's side of the distribution for at least one Congress during their careers: 37 Democrats in the House and 34 in the Senate; 6 Republicans in the House and 27 in the Senate.

within the parties have diminished, and moderates or party mavericks² have virtually disappeared. Within Congress, majority party members reflected the increasingly cohesive makeup of the party caucus and gave party leaders the authority to exercise greater control over the policy making process (Aldrich 1995; Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Brady, Cooper, and Hurley 1979; Cooper and Brady 1981; Rohde 1991). The ranks of members whose policy predispositions place them outside of the core of their party have shrunk considerably (Fleisher and Bond 2004, 2005; Theriault 2003). Looking at a longer period reveals that some members began moving toward the center long before the New Deal. When we look at the entire post-Reconstruction period of American history, the recent decline in party heterogeneity looks more like a return to a previous equilibrium than a new phenomenon.

Explaining Change I: Responding to Election Results

The patterns examined thus far suggest that something happened in the late 19th and early 20th centuries that prompted an increase in the number of moderates. Whatever it was, the change started about the same time in both houses, though growth was more rapid for Democrats than for Republicans. The effect eventually faded for both parties. The similarity of the patterns in both chambers suggests that an explanation focusing on differences in rules or practices between the House and Senate is unlikely to move us very far toward explanation. We focus on two other possible explanations.

The first is that more of the electorate shifted to a moderate and middle-of-the road position and members of Congress followed them. Survey data to directly measure voters' partisanship in states and districts is not available. An indirect indicator of voters' partisanship is the closeness of the presidential vote in states and districts—a close vote indicates a divided constituency, and a middle-of-the-road record may avoid alienating large numbers of constituents. In both the House and the

² For those who might be curious, the Senate's best known "maverick" John McCain never qualified as a "moderate" under our definition. His DW-NOMINATE scores range from .32 to .38, less conservative than many of his colleagues,

Senate, substantial percentages of members with moderate voting records were from election jurisdictions (districts or states) in which a presidential candidate receives 40-60 percent of the vote. From 1900-2006, 50 percent of House members, and 58 percent of Senators with moderate voting records came from constituencies with these election results.

Over time it is possible that election results clustering in the middle increased and then decreased, creating a rise and then decline in moderates. In the 1930s there was a significant shift away from Republican support towards the Democratic Party. That move may have increased the number of moderates from closely divided districts and states. Over time the New Deal coalition began to experience internal conflicts and conservatives mounted an attack on social trends, taxes and the growth of social programs. There was also considerable mobility and internal migration, creating many more suburban districts, presumably providing a basis for the conservative movement to flourish. That movement began in earnest in the 1960s and its effect may have been to push districts and states apart and create fewer middle range electoral bases.

If this scenario of change is correct, there should be an increase in middle-range districts from the 1920s to the 1940s, and then a gradual decline. Figure 5 presents the percentage of House districts and states in which the Democratic presidential percentage is between 40 and 60 percent. We find limited support for this explanation at best. There is considerable variation in the percentage of close presidential election results. Overall, however, there appears to be a long-term upward trend. Consistent with expectations, the low point in close districts occurs in the 1920s, and generally increases until 1948. And, except for the spike in close districts in the 1960 presidential election, there seems to be a general decline from 1948 to 1972. But the period after 1972, when moderates in Congress began to disappear, is characterized by relatively high percentages of close presidential results.

but conservative enough to keep him in the mainstream of his party.

[Figure 2 about here]

A more specific way to assess whether middle-of-the-road election results are the source of moderate voting records in Congress is to examine what kinds of districts moderates come from. If “moderate” election results drive voting records, then most moderates should come out of districts with equivalent voting records. For this question, only House results are used. In the Senate only one-third of seats are typically up for election in any given year so it is difficult to assess a current connection between voting results and voting records. For Democratic House members, districts are grouped by the percentage of vote that Democratic presidential candidates received. For Republican House members, districts are grouped by the percentage of the vote that Republican presidential candidates received. The figures indicate the percentage of all party moderates that came from different types of districts.

Two patterns are important. It is possible that moderate records might come from members in which their party did not fare well in the presidential election. A House member from a districts that shows weak support for the party is either likely to be a moderate or vote that way to survive. While this source of moderates is a possibility, there are few moderates that emerge from these districts. There are, to be sure, likely to be fewer party members elected from these districts, but nonetheless, very few moderates within either party come from such districts.

While substantial numbers of moderates do come from middle-of-the-road districts, for both parties, and particularly for Democrats, most moderates come from districts in which their party’s presidential candidate does well. Strong support for the party presidential candidate produces moderate voting by party members in the House. Why that occurs is the question addressed next.

[Figures 3 and 4 about here]

Explaining Change II: Expanding Constituencies and Shifting Party Agendas

The other possible explanation of the rise and decline of moderates focuses on changes in the agenda of each party. Our general argument is that party agendas change and variation in the presence of moderates reflects reactions to changing party agendas. And based on patterns observed thus far in this study, we suspect that patterns of agenda change and the responses will be similar in both houses of Congress.

The process of change is driven by parties responding to shifting social conditions in an attempt to build a majority coalition. Minority parties are particularly important because to increase their seats they must make inroads in areas outside their existing base. Making inroads into new areas is likely to require a party to incorporate new issues and compromise on some traditional policy preferences or in order to recruit candidates who can appeal to voters in these new constituencies. Success in winning seats in new areas, therefore, is likely to add new members to the congressional party who represent constituencies that have different interests than the existing party base. To get reelected, these new members push to change the party agenda in response to these new interests. The clash of these agendas produces moderates as the older base resists the new concerns.

In American politics, policy disagreements within each party have manifested themselves largely as regional clashes because of the different concerns within each region. To see if this expanding constituencies explanation is plausible, we look first at variation in the parties' electoral fortunes in different regions changed over time. Figure 5 presents the regional breakdown of congressional Democrats from 1876 to 2006.³ We see clearly that congressional Democrats were predominantly a Southern party for most of the period. Until the 1930s, two-thirds or more of House and Senate Democrats were from Southern and Border states. Variation in Democratic success in

³ Our definition of regions is an amalgamation of several frequently used but slightly different classification schemes. The major difference in the various definitions is how to define the South and Border states. All begin with the eleven states of the Confederacy and most also include Oklahoma and Kentucky with South. Some definitions also include Maryland, Missouri, and West Virginia as Border states. We adopt the inclusive definition, including these latter three Border states

winning seats in other regions is similar for House and Senate, except Democrats were more successful winning Senate seats in the West than was the case in the House. But notice that Democrats began making inroads in the Midwest and East beginning in the early 1920s.

[Figure 5 about here]

Republicans, in contrast, achieved electoral success in every region except the South for most of the period since the end of Reconstruction (see Figure 6). Although Republicans had become about as successful in the South as in other regions by the early 1980s, notice that they started to become more competitive in the region in the early 1960s. The patterns are similar in both chambers, except Republicans had greater success winning Senate seats in the West. Historically, therefore, Republicans have been much less concentrated in one region than were Democrats. Nonetheless, from the end of Reconstruction to the 1930s, the party base was anchored in the East and Midwest, though the concentration is greater in the House than in the Senate.

[Figure 6 about here]

Thus, following Reconstruction each party had a solid regional base—Democrats in the South, Republicans in the East and Midwest. Figure 7 reconfigures the presentation of the regional party breakdown to more clearly show the degree of regional concentration over time. We see that the parties in both the House and Senate were relatively concentrated in a particular region early in the period, and regional concentration generally declined over time.

[Figure 7 about here]

We have argued that when parties make inroads into regions outside their traditional base, it creates tension because new party members are likely to represent constituencies with different interests than those in the traditional party base. We have also argued that one manifestation of this

along with the usual suspects in our definition of “South.” The other variation is how to handle the “Plains” states. We include Iowa and Minnesota with the Midwest, and Kansas with the West.

tension is an increase in the number of moderates in the party caucus. If so, then there should be a relationship between regional concentration and the number of moderates. The relationship, however, is not linear. Rather, we expect few moderates at high levels of regional concentration, and the number of moderates should rise as regional concentration declines. But if regional concentration continues to decline to the point where the traditional base region is no longer dominant, then the policy preferences of representatives elected from new regions and those from the traditional base region might begin to converge, leading to a decline in the number moderates.

Figure 8, shows the expected hill-shaped relationships. Although the specific parameters differ, the overall shape of the relationships is remarkably similar for both Democrats and Republicans and in the House and Senate.⁴ As regional concentration declined from highs of around 90%, there is a relatively steep rise in the number of moderates. The number of moderates peaks at about 50% concentration and then declines relatively sharply as regional concentration falls to the 20%-30% range. Although this evidence is indirect, it is consistent with what we would expect as parties become competitive in different regions. But we need to determine if policy agendas were changing as the parties were becoming less regionally concentrated.

[Figure 8 about here]

We suspect that the nature of the agenda changed as the Democratic Party became more competitive in other regions of the country during the 1920s and 1930s and new members pursued a new set of policies. Southern Democrats resisted and began to drift toward the center. They were moderate in the sense that they were resisting an agenda that was shifting away from what they were

⁴ A second degree polynomial describes the relationships well for both parties in both chambers. A second degree polynomial provides a large increase in R^2 over linear, and with the exception of House Democrats, moving to a third degree polynomial does not improve the R^2 . We rely on the second degree polynomial estimates for interpretation, but we show the higher level estimates for House Democrats for those who might be interested.

willing to support. Eventually many became the conservative wing of the party. Gradually the number of moderates declined as they were replaced by those more accepting of the new agenda.

The pattern for Republicans was different. Republicans in the Northeast were the most conservative from the 1870s through the 1920s. But as an agenda of a greater federal role emerged by the 1930s they eventually became more accepting of this new role and they began to move away from their conservative record during the 1930s, becoming the party's new moderates. Gradually the party base shifted to outside the Northeast (Reiter 2007), and the moderates within the party were replaced by liberal Democrats, resulting in the demise of moderate Republicans.

These shifts in party agendas created moderates within both parties. These agenda shifts first pushed Democrats who were formerly liberal and highly supportive of the party toward the middle. Southern Democrats differed with the shifting party agenda and by the 1930s had become the new moderates. Within the Republican Party those who were formerly conservative became moderates. Northeast Republicans who were less opposed than the conservative wing to the new federal policies of the 1930s became the bulk of that party's new moderates.⁵ These moderates did not persist within either party because realignment within regions resulted in their gradual decline. In most cases the decline occurred because moderates were replaced by members from the opposing party who were not moderates (Fleisher and Bond 2004). Moderates were not reflective of an enduring center within relatively stable party agendas, but of changes within each party.

The Democrats' Dilemma and a Changing Party Agenda

Party agendas are always subject to change over time. Social conditions change or the public sees the world differently and seeks new policies. Parties seek to respond to changing conditions (Polsby, 2004; Stonecash, 2006; Brewer and Stonecash, 2009). A minority party may be particularly

receptive to changing its agenda to appeal to new concerns in an effort to gain votes and seats. The attraction of new support may bring items to the agenda that were not considered before and members of Congress must react to new issues. This is the dynamic we wish to follow. We begin with Democrats because moderates first emerged as a significant force within that party.

As we have seen, from the late 1800s through the 1920s the Democratic Party was concentrated in the South—an average of 66 percent of House Democrats and 72 percent of Senate Democrats came from this region. From 1900 through 1928 in presidential elections they struggled to win states outside the South and lost five of seven elections. If they were ever going to become a majority party, Democrats had to win seats outside the South, either in the West or the North. While some argued the best prospects for the party were in the West because it had the commonality of being rural and agricultural, it was also the case that the party did fairly well in urban areas in the North. The prospects in the North prompted Democrats to sponsor labor legislation to try to gain support from the growing immigrant population working in urban areas of the North (Sanders, 1999; Bensel, 2000). Although the congressional party wanted to expand its base to gain a majority, the primary impetus came from Democratic presidential candidates who knew they could not win the presidency without winning states outside the South (James 2000).

The North was important to the party for four reasons. First, Democrats were generally in the minority for these 30 years (see Table 1, column 5). Second, in the early 1900s, roughly 54 percent of all House districts were in the North (see columns 1 and 2).⁵ Consequently, it would be difficult to create a majority within Congress without making some inroads into the North. Third, the party attained a majority only when it reduced its reliance on the South and won more seats in the North

⁵ While this generalization is true it should not be overstated. Most, but not all, moderate to conservative Democrats were elected from the South, while most, but not all, moderate to liberal Republicans were from the Northeast. The regional split in the Republican Party, however, has never been as pronounced as the North/South split among Democrats.

⁶ Defined here as states running from Maine down to New Jersey and across Pennsylvania to Illinois up to Minnesota.

(columns 6 and 7). Democrats clearly needed to win more seats outside the South. Finally, there was a substantial percentage of districts in the North in which Democratic House candidates received between 40–49 percent of the vote (shown in column 8). Democrats were already receiving substantial (but not majority) support in Northern urban areas (Eldersveld 1949; Degler 1964). It should have been possible to build on that. Making gains in the North seemed a feasible goal. To succeed in these states Democrats had to become more responsive to northern urban interests (Burner 1968; Ware 2006).

[Table 1 about here]

This situation gave the North more leverage than their numbers as a percent of the party might suggest. Rather than the North appealing to the South, it was more of a case of the South seeking votes in the North and having to accommodate the concerns of the North. The difficulty for the Democrats was that their desire to appeal to the North often conflicted with their unease about some aspects of the North. Immigration, urbanization, and industrialization were becoming a source of conflict between the northern and southern wings of the party.

This pursuit of additional support outside the South was filled with considerable ambivalence, however. If Southern Democrats pursued a Western strategy, they could appeal to somewhat compatible agrarian interests. Some thought the more likely long-term coalition would form around a vaguely stated “common man” versus the Eastern interests. That could conceivably join agricultural and labor interests (Sanders, 1999). The difficulty was that this involved bridging a cultural gap. If they sought votes in Northern urban areas this would mean that Southern largely rural, fundamentalist Protestant Democrats would have to appeal to a population they were often uncomfortable with.

From the late 1880s through the 1920s, the North was undergoing significant changes while the South was not. The population changed from being largely rural to predominantly urban. Large numbers of immigrants came to the United States, changing the composition of many northern states.

The percentage of the national population that was foreign-born increased significantly, ranging from 13–15 percent of the population across those fifty years.⁷ If those born to parents of foreign born are included, the immigrant population reached 35 percent by the 1920s.⁸ This was a population very different from that in the South. Many immigrants were Catholic, did not speak English, located in urban areas, and worked in manufacturing. To many Southerners they represented a strange and alien population.

The party wanted to expand its electoral base, but the nature of this new population created a succession of conflicts with the older base of the Democratic Party. First came cultural conflicts in the 1920s, involving issues such as prohibition and the regulation of immigration. They were followed by issues of labor and economic management.

These changes created clashes over what populations and ways of life would be accepted and then clashes over the role of government in a changing economy. To many in American society, the tendency of immigrants to create ethnic enclaves in cities, continue to speak their native language, worship in Catholic churches, and send their children to parochial schools was seen as a threat to American society (Wiebe, 1966). In many Northern states there had been clashes over making English the official language, discouraging parochial schools, and limiting access to alcohol (Kleppner, 1970). As we will indicate later, these conflicts led to legislative differences.

Then changes in the economy became an issue as change created different social conditions. As urban employment became more common, more workers were becoming dependent on employment in large factories. Labor unions were struggling to organize workers to provide them with some protection and leverage in bargaining for wages (Dawley 1991). The era in which individuals could be self-reliant on farms was ending and some states responded by enacting policies

⁷ <http://www.census.biz/prod/2000pubs/cenbr002.pdf>.

⁸ U.S. Historical Statistics

to provide workers with regulation of working conditions and with unemployment compensation when employers eliminated jobs. Some also enacted programs to provide unemployment compensation, retirement support, and welfare aid (Amenta 1998; Mettler 1998). There were numerous groups seeking to make these national programs, but the more conservative states were reluctant to encourage federal pressures to adopt such programs within their states. If they were to be adopted, some states worried about having to comply with federal program requirements of benefit levels and eligibility requirements (Derthick 1970). By the 1920s some states had these programs and were desirous of supporting federal aid while others did not want to have to provide various programs. The Northern wing of the party wanted legislation favorable to labor, while the South, with an agricultural economic base, was not sympathetic to such concerns.

These programs embodied a different notion of liberalism (Foner 1998). A liberal had been defined as someone who wished to preserve individual freedom and saw an oppressive government as the primary threat to that freedom. The goal was to restrain government. These new programs were based on a notion that individuals were living in a different kind of society, one in which individuals had less control over their fate. They were vulnerable to large corporations which could dictate their work conditions. They were no longer self-sufficient on farms and needed a temporary “safety net” to help them when they suffered injuries, were laid off, retired, or an income earning member of the family died. In this view government was not a threat to freedom, but an institution that could use its resources to help buffer individuals from the vagaries of the modern capitalistic economy.

For Democrats these conflicts created pressures for the party to accept a much greater role for the national government in trying to affect the situations of individuals. The “new” liberals of the party, largely from the northeast, pushed for a greater role for government for policy and political reasons. They were seeking to redefine “liberal” from an effort to restrain government and large corporations to having government play an active role in affecting the situation of individuals and

provide them with a safety net. The “older” Southern wing of the party, which had been advocating a liberal agrarian - populist set of policies, was reluctant to accept this new notion of liberalism and this role for government. As the national agenda changed, the Southern Democrats became the moderates within the party. Southern moderates persisted for several decades until civil rights legislation resulted in districts that elected Democratic liberals or the strengthened Republican Party in the South sent conservative Republicans to Congress.

These changes – immigration and urbanization and a different population, changing forms of employment, different ideas about the role and obligation of government – were occurring primarily within the North. The South remained agricultural, rural, and Protestant, and uneasy about forming a bond with the North (Burner, 1968). As these issues emerged and the party had to grapple with new members from the North, it created tensions within the Democratic Party. It was still the case, however, that the South remained strongly Democratic and Democratic presidential candidates still did relatively better in the South. That created a situation in which resistance to a changing agenda – the emergence of moderates - was occurring in districts in which Democratic presidential candidates did best. Loyalty to the party was high in terms of voter support, but members of Congress were resisting a changing agenda. With this as background of the challenges facing the Democratic Party, we now seek to provide empirical evidence to support the general narrative about the effects of agenda change.

Classifying Bills and Tracking Change in Issues

We seek to determine how the type of issues presented in Congress changed and the extent to which issues promoted disagreement within the party. To systematically assess how the presence of different types of issues varied over time, we coded all roll call votes in the House and Senate into seventeen substantive categories, plus a residual category that includes internal housekeeping and procedural votes that could not be categorized, symbolic votes, and votes on private bills. The substantive categories are Defense, Foreign Affairs, Economic Regulation, Government and the

Economy, Trade, Agriculture, Labor, Distributive programs, Cultural, Social Welfare, Race, Education, Environment, Energy, Transportation, Crime, and Science and Technology. The description of the categories is presented in appendix A.⁹

We look first at changes in which issues were most prominent on the congressional floor agenda over time. We define prominent issues as those that comprised at least six percent of the substantive roll calls on the chamber floor during each decade. Although six percent is an arbitrary threshold, it is a reasonable standard. If seventeen categories were evenly distributed, each one would account for about 5.9 percent of the agenda. The issues, of course, never approached an even distribution, but an ocular analysis of the ranking of issues in each decade suggested that a six percent threshold was a natural break point that identified from four to eight prominent issues.

Table 2 shows the relative prominence of issues on the House and Senate floor in each decade from the 1900s to the 1990s. The table shows several clear patterns of the prominence of issues on the floor of Congress. First, some issues were consistently prominent over the entire period. Defense, Foreign Affairs, Economic Regulation and Government and the Economy were among the most prominent issues in almost all decades. Second, some issues were prominent in the early decades and then disappeared: Trade was prominent from the 1900s through the 1920s; Agriculture and Distributive issues came up later (1910s in the House, 1920s in the Senate) and dropped off in the 1950s; and Labor became prominent a decade or so after that (1920s in the House, 1930s in the Senate) and dropped off in the 1950s. Third, the pattern for Cultural issues is bi-modal. This type of issue was prominent in the early decades (1900s-1920s) and in recent decades (1980s and 1990s), and largely absent in the middle decades. Fourth, Social Welfare issues show up in the 1930s and

⁹ The list of roll call votes is from Keith Poole's webpage. For each roll call, there is a brief summary of the what the vote was about. One person classified each roll call and then those classifications were reviewed by one other person. We are aware that the summaries are brief and may not be complete summaries of the legislation. In numerous cases, we looked up bills to gain a greater understanding of their content. We will discuss some bills in more detail later.

remained prominent through the 1990s. Fifth, several issues show up sporadically and briefly. Environment, Energy, Race, Transportation, and Education are prominent in only one decade and/or in only one chamber. And finally, two issues (Crime and Science & Technology) were never among the most prominent issues.

[Table 2 about here]

Furthermore, the appearance and disappearance of prominent issues is the same in both the House and Senate. Whatever process it is that generates these changes, it plays out almost exactly the same in both chambers.

The Reaction of the South

One way to gauge tensions between Southern and Northern Democrats is to measure disagreement on roll call votes. A common indicator is the so-called “Conservative Coalition” vote, defined as those on which a majority of Southern Democrats vote against a majority of Northern Democrats and Republicans (Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1993, 87; Shelley 1983). But notice that “Conservative Coalition” votes do not capture all votes on which the Southern and Northern wings of the Democratic Party diverge. There are some votes on which a majority of Republicans coalesce with a majority of Northern Democrats against a majority of Southern Democrats. Congressional Quarterly called these cases a “Civil Rights Coalition” in part because there were some key votes in the 1960s on which Republican support helped overcome Southern opposition to civil rights legislation. These votes are instances of a North/South split, and all did not involve “civil rights”. Although defining intra-party splits in this way is reasonable, these categories mask considerable variation in the degree of conflict.

We want to determine the overall level of regional conflict within the Democratic party along a continuum from minor levels of disagreement to maximum disagreement. We measure the level of conflict between Southern and Northern Democrats as the absolute value of the difference between the

percentage of Southern Democrats and Northern Democrats voting yea on each roll call. Thus, the measure ranges from zero (no disagreement within the party) to 100 (Southern and Northern Democrats polarized on opposite sides of the issue). To see how issues affected the level of intra-party conflict, we regressed the level of conflict between Southern and Northern Democrats on roll call votes during each decade on a series of dummy variables indicating the type of issue. The coefficients indicate the percent change in the level of disagreement between Southern and Northern Democrats on roll calls in the issue category—a positive coefficient indicates that the issue increased the difference; a negative coefficient indicates that the difference decreased on that issue; insignificant coefficients indicate that the issue had no affect the level of conflict. The omitted category is internal housekeeping and procedural votes that could not be categorized, symbolic votes and votes on private bills. Table 3 shows which issues affected the level of regional conflict in the Democratic party in each decade from the 1900s to the 1940s.

[Table 3 about here]

The most consistently prominent issues on the congressional agenda—Defense, Foreign Affairs, Economic Regulation, and Government and the Economy—typically had no significant affect on the level of disagreement between Southern and Northern Democrats. In those decades when there was a significant relationship, the effect generally was to reduce conflict by about 3 to 5 percent relative to the base category. Votes on trade issues also tended to produce moderate declines in the level of regional disagreement. The patterns in the House and Senate are similar in terms of direction and magnitude. Foreign Affairs votes have significant affects more often in the Senate than in the House, which may reflect the Senate’s greater role in foreign policy.

Other issues on the floor of Congress tended to increase the level of regional conflict if there was a significant effect. The issues associated with the largest increases in the level of regional conflict were roll calls on Race, Culture, Social Welfare, and Labor. Recall that votes on race were

seldom among the most prominent issues on the floor agenda, but the votes that did occur tended to produce the highest levels of regional conflict. Votes dealing with race increased the level of conflict between Southern and Northern Democrats in every decade in the House, and the effect grew over time from about 18 percent in the 1900s around 50 percent in the 1930s and 1940s. In the Senate, race had no significant influence in the first two decades, but from the 1920s through the 1940s the effect was large (27 to 45 percent greater than the base category). Roll calls on Social Welfare, Labor, and Culture issues were also associated with relatively large increases in the level of disagreement between Southern and Northern Democrats. Votes on agriculture were associated with moderate increases in the level of regional conflict through the 1930s. The effects of these issues are similar in timing, direction, and magnitude in both chambers.

An indicator of overall tension among congressional Democrats is the number of issues that affect the level of conflict in each decade. The pattern in the Senate is particularly striking. In the 1910s and 1920s, eight issues produced significantly higher levels of conflict between Southern and Northern Democrats in the Senate. In the New Deal decade of 1930s, in contrast, there were only two issue areas that generated significantly greater disagreement on the Senate floor, but there were four issues that tended reduce conflict. In the House, it was the 1930s that had the largest number of issues that tended to generate more regional conflict.

Another way to track the effects of a changed agenda is to follow the behavior of cohorts of members. Past research indicates that members' policy preferences are relatively stable over the course of their careers. Any changes in policy making behavior in the institution of Congress are mainly the result of electoral replacement that brings new members with new preferences to Congress (Fleisher and Bond 2004, Theriault 2006). If members have stable preferences but their voting record changes, then we may assume that the change reflects the agenda to which they are reacting. Long serving representatives presumably managed to survive because they "adapted" in response to

changing conditions. To assess the reaction of long serving members, we plot changes in the roll call voting behavior of cohorts of long serving Southern Democrats in the House (Figure 9) and Senate (Figure 10). This presents a Mayhewesque¹⁰ presentation of trends in DW-NOMINATE scores of cohorts of long serving Southern Democrats who entered Congress in different eras. Except for the base period in the 19th century (Period 0 = 1876-1900) we divided members into cohorts based on apportionment periods: period 1 = 1902-1910; period 2 = 1912-1920; period 3 = 1922-1930; period 4 = 1932-1940. Then for each cohort of members who served 12 or more years, we plotted the trend in their DW-NOMINATE scores over the course of their careers. We chose 12 years (six terms in the House, two terms in the Senate) as the definition of “long serving” because this ensures that Senators survived at least one reelection and House members survived several reelections through at least one reapportionment. Given the way DW-NOMINATE scores are constructed, an individual member’s trend over time will be linear. But the slope of each member’s linear trend line can be negative (indicating change in the liberal direction), positive (indicating increasing conservatism), or essentially flat indicating no change over time. It is the behavior of the cohort rather than the behavior of each individual that we are interested in. We use the mean DW-NOMINATE score of all members of the cohort in the decade in which they first entered the House and for each subsequent decade until all members of the cohort have left Congress. Looking at the means provides a summary picture of how the cohort changed over the course of the members’ careers.

Starting with the House (Figure 9), we see that long serving Southern Democrats who entered the House in the 19th century (1876-1900) started their careers with a liberal voting record (mean for the cohort is -.48), and ended their careers at essentially the same place, or perhaps slightly more liberal (mean of the last ones to exit is -.57). We did not find a single case with a score in the

¹⁰ The presentation is suggested by Mayhew’s (1974, 298-302) series of bar graphs documenting the “vanishing marginals.”

moderate range (above -.2). Those entering in the first decade of the 20th century (1902-1910) started their careers at the same place as the previous cohort (-.47), but this group moved steadily to the right, ending with a mean just below the moderate range (-.27). And notice that we see a couple of cases with scores in the moderate to conservative range. The next cohort entering in the 1912-1920 period started out at a similarly liberal point (mean = -.40), but this group moved more sharply to right, with numerous members ending their service as moderates (mean = -.07). The cohort that entered in the period immediately before the New Deal (1922-1930) generally began their careers as moderates (mean = .20), and moved to the right over time (ending mean = -.07). The New Deal cohort entering 1932-1940 started their careers in the center of moderate liberal range (-.11) and drifted slightly to right ending their careers barely on the liberal side of the scale (mean = -.04).

[Figure 9 about here]

The pattern of change for long serving Senators is similar (Figure 10). The number of cases in cohorts is small and there no cases of long serving senators who began their careers in the 1920s, but the overall pattern in the Senate is consistent with the House analysis. The cohort of long serving Southern Democrats elected in the 19th century started their Senate careers in liberal tail of the distribution (mean = -.52) and had moved only slightly toward the middle by the time all had left (mean = -.36). The next cohort elected in period 1 (1902-1910) started where the previous cohort ended (-.37), but by the time this cohort was gone, they had drifted into the moderate range (-.19). The cohort who entered in period 2 (1912-1920) started their careers at the same point as the previous cohort (-.31). A couple of Senators in this cohort moved in the liberal direction, but most moved toward the center, and by the time the last of this cohort was gone the mean score was on the conservative side of the distribution (mean = .22). The New Deal cohort first elected between 1932 and 1940 started in the middle of the distribution (.002) moved slightly to the right over the course of their careers (mean = .08).

[Figure 10 about here]

We believe that changes in the policy agenda account for the conservative drift of Southern Democrats over the course of several decades. Keep in mind that these particular members are atypical in that they were able to survive over the course of at least twelve years. Although there are numerous reasons that might explain longevity in Congress, certainly one of the key reasons is that members were in touch with and responsive to changing preferences of voters in their states and districts. Since every cohort of long serving Southern Democrats elected in the 20th century moved to right, it seems reasonable to conclude that they were reflecting changing voter preferences.

As for the timing of these agenda changes, note that the movement started well before the Great Depression and New Deal. Members' roll call voting behavior at the beginning of their careers is a good reflection of responses to electoral reactions to a shifting agenda at that time. Recall that numerous Southern House Democrats who began their service between 1922 and 1930 started out as moderates, and those elected during the New Deal period were slightly more conservative. When we analyze the process of replacement, we suspect that the pattern of liberals being replaced by moderates will begin in the 1920s, well before the New Deal.

We can get a more comprehensive of picture of regional tensions by looking at trends in the mean DW-NOMINATE scores by region for Democrats and Republicans in the House and Senate. It allows us to compare how and when policy preferences of Democrats and Republicans from different regions changed (see Figure 11).

[Figure 11 about here]

Trends for Democrats are consistent with previous analyses. From the end of Reconstruction until the early 1920s, the mean Democratic DW-NOMINATE score of Southern Democrats in both the House and Senate was around -.50 or less. Southern Democrats continued to anchor the left tail of the distribution until early 1900s. After about 1912, we see the start of a monotonic rise in the mean DW-

NOMINATE score of Southern House Democrats. It crosses into the moderate range around 1932, and continues the rightward drift peaking at around -.09 in the 1940s. Southern Democrats in the Senate started moving to right several decades earlier in the 1890s. The drift to the right was almost monotonic, crossing into the moderate range around 1930 and peaking at -.01 in the 1940s. Democrats from other regions were generally to right of the party mean. Eastern House Democrats started moving to the left around 1916, and had become the liberal wing of the party by 1924. Midwestern and Western Democrats eventually followed the Eastern states and by the 1940s all three regions had mean scores in the neighborhood of -.4.¹¹ There were so few non-Southern Democrats in the Senate until the 1920s, that it is difficult to discern a pattern. But in the 1920s, non-Southern Democrats were generally in the moderate range. They started moving in the liberal direction in the late 1920s, and converged at a mean around -.4 by 1960.

Thus, we see additional evidence that the changes in the voting behavior of Southern Democrats started well before the Great Depression. The conventional view that Southern Democrats joined with Republicans to form a “Conservative Coalition” beginning in the late 1930s is not accurate. Southern Democrats may have become disillusioned with New Deal policies and the formation of so-called Conservative Coalition peaked in the early 1940s, but the rightward drift of Southern Democrats started much earlier.

Furthermore, given the institutional differences designed to insulate Senators from changing conditions—namely, longer terms and staggered elections—we had expected changes in the Senate to lag the House. But this analysis shows Southern Democratic Senators started moving to right

¹¹ From the early 1900s to 1928, Western House Democrats moved sharply in the conservative direction and were briefly the only region in the moderate range. But the number of Western Democrats was small until the New Deal Years, so their behavior had little affect on the overall party mean. Yet, it appears that the new Western Democrats had preferences more in line with the new agenda than Western Democrats who served before the New Deal.

considerably earlier than in the House. The previous analyses of regional concentration of the party and of agenda change also failed to reveal any tendency for the Senate to lag the House.

Republicans and Change

The analysis of Republicans is ongoing, so we have less comprehensive results to report. The evidence we do have suggests that the process played out differently within the Republican Party, but the patterns are similar in both the House and Senate. Policies enacted during the Great Depression were very different from what Republicans wanted. While the party generally opposed the array of social programs enacted in the 1930s, the Eastern wing of the party gradually became more accepting, while the rest of the party continued to resist. The Eastern Republicans became the new moderates within the party. They persisted until many of them were gradually replaced by Democrats. Over time the moderates within each party have declined because those resisting the direction of their party were replaced by members from the opposing party.

The Republican Party has had fewer moderates and they emerged later. We argue that the rise of moderates within the Republican Party was also prompted by a shifting agenda. But within the Republican Party the dynamic was that the region most accepting of the changes was the primary base of the party, the Northeast. Republican members from this region were less troubled by a growing role for the national government. Members from that area defected from the opposition of their party and became moderates.

The patterns in Figure 11 are consistent with this interpretation. Eastern Republicans moved from being the most conservative core of the party to being more moderate and the least loyal of the regional blocs of Republicans. From 1876 to the 1920s, Eastern Republicans were the most conservative wing of the party. But beginning in the early to mid-1920s, Eastern Republicans began steadily moving to the left. In the House, Eastern Republicans had become less conservative than Republicans from other regions, and moved into the moderate range from 1960 until the mid-1980s.

Although Eastern Republicans moved back in the conservative direction in the 1980s and 1990s, they are still least conservative region. Eastern Senate Republicans started a steady movement to the left after 1920. They had moved into the moderate range by 1940 and remained there until the mid-1990s. Although they started moving back to the right after 1976, they remain the least conservative bloc of Republicans.

Compared to changes of congressional Democrats, we that while Southern Democrats were rejecting their shifting party and moving to the middle, Eastern Republicans were more accepting of a greater role for the national government. While a conservative movement resisting a larger government role was growing outside the East (Phillips 1970; Rae 1989; Micklethwait and Woolridge 2004), Eastern Republicans were less opposed and moved toward the center.

For example, looking at some key votes in the House, we see that these Republican moderates were more supportive of raising the minimum wage in 1961 than the rest of the party (Table 4). They were also more supportive of the Appalachian Development Act, of national financial assistance for local schools, and of the establishment of Medicare. These northern moderates were eventually replaced as this region of the country steadily moved more Democratic (Reiter 2001; 2007).

Summary

The changes in party diversity – from limited diversity to high diversity and then declining diversity – represent a remarkable evolution over time. The parties have experienced changes in their composition and unity over the last century. The increased diversity reduced the average difference between the parties and then as they sorted out their electoral bases the differences have again increased. Southern Democrats, once the dominant core of the Democratic Party, became an undependable fringe within the party and with some frequency deserted the party to work with the opposition party. While Southern Democrats were moving to the center, Democrats from other regions were becoming the new core.

Moderates have varied enormously over time in their presence within the House. We offer here a tentative explanation of why they emerged and why they have declined. There is much work to do to document the changed political agenda that is at the center of this argument. There is also much to explore about how moderates declined. As moderates left Congress either through retirement or defeat, were by representatives who were not moderate? We suspect that most of these non-moderate replacements are mainstream members from the other party. But were open seats held by moderates won by mainstream members of the other party as well. If the party held on to an open seat, was the winner a moderate or mainstream member? We will pursue these questions in future work. Our hope is that this paper establishes that the rise of moderates started well before the New Deal, and that explaining this variation over time is central to our efforts to understand parties, their agenda, and their extent of unity.

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AppendixA: Categories definitions for bills

Social Welfare (0-999) - includes any program that involves the direct transfer of \$ to individuals or the indirect transfer through the states or local governments with the intent of improving the condition of those at the bottom of the socio-economic structure in the U.S.

Cultural Issues (1000-1999) - includes matters having to do with religion, ethnicity (not race), immigration, gender, alternative lifestyles

General Budget & Economic Management (2000-2999) - includes items that involve the government trying to use the tools of either fiscal policy or monetary policy to achieve desired economic effects

Government Economic Regulation (3000-3999) - matters related to efforts by the federal government to control the behavior of economic actors. Included in this category would be anti-trust laws, fair trade legislation, regulation of the communication sector, consumer protection, etc.

Labor (4000-4999) - Any legislation aimed at promoting or restricting the unionization of workers, treatment of workers on the job

Infrastructure and Public Works (5000-5999) - matters related to physical infrastructure projects and programs that distribute money to states and local communities

Environment and Wildlife (6000-6999) - bills dealing with the protection of the physical environment and wildlife

Agriculture (7000-7999) - price supports for crops, methods of farming, issues having to do with rural communities

Defense and National Security (8000-8999) - use of the military, weapons procurement, wars, cia, military intelligence

Foreign Affairs (9000-9999) - matters including foreign aid, use of diplomacy, UN

Trade and Globalization (10000-10999) - tariffs and protectionism, free trade, NAFTA and other regional economic agreements

The Political Process (11000-11999) - reforms aimed at the workings of the political process including those having to do with elections, separation of powers, federalism, internal workings of the legislative, executive or judicial branches of government

Energy (12000-12999) - development, use and conservation of all matters related to energy including mining, oil and gas, nuclear power, and alternative sources of energy.

Transportation (13000-13999) - all matters related to transportation including support and regulation of transportation alternatives (air, train, auto, mass transit).

Science & Tech (14000-14999) - matters related to science and technology including support for various scientific endeavors

Appropriation Bills (15000-15999) - appropriation bills for the various departments and agencies of the federal government (note: in some cases appropriation bills were not marked as such because of the use of two substantive codes)

Education (16000-16999) - any matter related to funding of or federal control of education.

Race and Civil Rights (17000-17999) - matters related to the African American experience in the US including voting rights, school desegregation, fair housing, affirmative action, discrimination, etc.

Crime and Criminal justice (18000-18999) - matters related to federal support for crime prevention including grants to states and local communities; regulation of federal prisons; rights of the accused; combating narcotics; etc.

Symbolic (19000)

Private Bills (20000)

Figure 1
Democratic and Republican Moderates in Congress





Figure 2

**House Districts and States with Democratic Presidential
Percentage Between 40-60 Percent, 1900-2008**




Figure 3




Figure 4




Figure 5
Democratic Electoral Fortunes in Different Regions





Figure 6
Republican Electoral Fortunes in Different Regions





Figure 7
Regional Concentration of Democrats and Republicans in Congress







Figure 8
Relationship between Regional Party Concentration and the Number of Party Moderates











Figure 9
Trends in Southern House Democrats' Ideology by Era in Which They Entered the House










Figure 10
Trends in Southern Senate Democrats' Ideology by Era in Which They Entered the House







Figure 11
Changes in Ideology of Democrats and Republicans from Different Regions over Time




Table 1
The Democrats' Dilemma: The Relevance of the North
for Party Success in the House, 1900–1928

	All House Districts		% of Northern Districts Dem Pres Candidate Won		Democratic House Seats			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Year	# in North	% n North	50 % +	40-49 %	Dem % of all seats	% from South	% from North	% from North that are 40-49 % D
1900	195	54.9	25.1	36.3	42.6	57.9	27.0	47.2
1902	212	54.8			46.3	54.8	29.6	44.1
1904	212	54.8	16.4	16.9	35.5	70.1	19.0	28.0
1906	212	54.8			42.2	58.3	28.2	37.4
1908	212	54.8	5.7	44.0	44.0	54.1	30.2	40.8
1910	212	54.8			56.8	43.2	42.3	48.3
1912	232	53.3	3.5	45.3	67.1	35.4	47.8	36.6
1914	232	53.3			51.6	45.1	33.0	35.9
1916	232	53.3	34.3	48.3	46.4	46.5	28.7	41.8
1918	232	53.3			43.9	53.4	27.2	36.2
1920	232	53.3	.5	15.3	30.2	74.8	13.0	24.1
1922	232	53.3			47.1	49.8	32.2	36.6
1924	232	53.3	.5	7.5	41.9	56.0	25.3	20.4
1926	232	53.3			44.6	52.6	28.4	19.6
1928	232	53.3	20.9	27.4	38.3	55.4	28.9	25.7

Table 2
Prominence of Issues on the Floor of Congress, 1900s to 1990s

Issue Category	House										Senate									
	1900s	1910s	1920s	1930s	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s	1900s	1910s	1920s	1930s	1940s	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	1990s
Defense	7%	13%	8%	12%	16%	14%	10%	9%	13%	8%	4%	21%	4%	15%	14%	12%	12%	8%	16%	10%
Foreign Affs	3%	3%	4%	2%	7%	7%	7%	7%	6%	6%	9%	12%	6%	4%	11%	12%	13%	10%	11%	6%
Econ Reg	7%	7%	7%	9%	5%	5%	7%	7%	6%	8%	16%	9%	9%	10%	6%	7%	7%	8%	7%	11%
Govt & Econ	3%	6%	7%	11%	11%	7%	5%	10%	6%	8%	5%	9%	11%	17%	12%	8%	9%	14%	12%	20%
Trade	10%	7%	6%	4%	2%	4%	3%	3%	4%	3%	27%	23%	21%	8%	4%	5%	3%	2%	5%	3%
Agric	1%	7%	8%	9%	5%	7%	4%	3%	3%	2%	2%	5%	7%	13%	12%	9%	4%	3%	4%	5%
Distributive	5%	6%	6%	8%	4%	14%	8%	5%	4%	3%	5%	5%	6%	8%	5%	7%	4%	3%	3%	3%
Labor	1%	5%	9%	6%	7%	7%	5%	4%	2%	2%	6%	3%	4%	8%	10%	8%	5%	4%	4%	3%
Culture	7%	7%	7%	4%	2%	1%	3%	4%	5%	8%	5%	7%	7%	2%	2%	1%	3%	4%	9%	9%
Social Welf	2%	5%	5%	9%	10%	7%	8%	9%	7%	6%	2%	3%	5%	8%	8%	7%	11%	8%	9%	11%
Race	0%	1%	1%	2%	2%	3%	3%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	2%	2%	5%	10%	3%	2%	0%
Envir	4%	2%	4%	3%	1%	2%	5%	6%	7%	8%	2%	2%	1%	1%	2%	2%	3%	4%	4%	4%
Energy	1%	2%	2%	3%	3%	4%	2%	7%	2%	1%	1%	2%	4%	2%	3%	5%	1%	12%	4%	3%
Transp	3%	3%	1%	1%	1%	3%	4%	4%	2%	2%	7%	2%	1%	2%	1%	2%	3%	2%	2%	2%
Educ	0%	1%	2%	0%	1%	4%	5%	2%	2%	3%	1%	0%	1%	1%	1%	3%	5%	2%	2%	6%
Crime	0%	1%	1%	2%	2%	3%	3%	1%	1%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	1%	3%	4%
Sci & Tech	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	2%	2%	2%	3%	0%	0%	0%	0%	1%	3%	2%	1%	1%	2%

Entries are the percentage of roll call votes dealing with each issue category. Percentages do not sum to 100 because some issues were coded in more than one category. Internal housekeeping and procedural votes that could not be categorized, symbolic votes and votes on private bills are not reported.

Table 3
Effects of Issues on the Degree of Disagreement between
Southern and Northern Democrats on the Floor of Congress, 1900s-1940s

Issue Area	House					Senate				
	1900s	1910s	1920s	1930s	1940s	1900s	1910s	1920s	1930s	1940s
Defense				5.5	-6.8					-4.7
For Affs	-4.5				-12.5	-4.5	-3.7	3.8	-7.3	
Econ Reg						-3.7	2.5		-2.9	
Govt & Econ		-7.6	-7.6				-5.5		-2.8	4.6
Trade	-2.9	-4.7	-4.7		-17.3	-5.6	-4.6	3.7		-6.0
Agric	8.3	8.2	8.2	4.5			5.4	8.5	6.4	
Labor				17.9	13.6		4.1	6.1		15.3
Distrib					-9.5		1.1	5.7		-7.5
Culture		15.7	15.7	15.3	13.7	5.1	8.2	19.9		17.0
Soc Welf	21.8	9.1	9.1			26.9	6.5		-3.9	
Race	17.9	35.4	35.4	53.6	49.9			45.0	38.6	27.5
Educ						11.3		36.3		
Envir							5.6			
Energy					-2.8					
Transp							6.7			9.1
Crime	27.4									
Sci & Tech										
Constant	8.4	15.1	15.1	11.1	24.9	14.9	13.7	12.2	15.0	19.1

Entries are regression coefficients of the absolute difference in the roll call voting behavior of Southern and Northern Democrats on dummy variables indicating the type of issue. The coefficients indicate the percent change in the absolute difference between Southern and Northern Democrats on roll calls in the issue category--a positive coefficient indicates that the issue increased the difference; a negative coefficient indicates that the difference decreased on that issue. Only coefficients significant at .05 or better are presented. The omitted category is internal housekeeping and procedural votes that could not be categorized, symbolic votes and votes on private bills.

Table 4:
Internal Divisions within the Republican Party
Between the Eastern Wing and the Remainder of the Party

Bill and Dates	Non-North		North		Democrats	
	#	% yes	#	% yes	#	% yes
Raise Minimum wage – 1961	57	63.2	120	80.8	274	76.3
Moderates	10	90.0	46	91.3		
Appalachian Development Act - 1965	53	5.7	90	24.4	302	77.2
Moderates	7	14.3	30	43.3		
Elementary Secondary Act – 1965	53	15.1	90	30.0	302	75.8
Moderates	7	42.9	30	63.3		
Medicare – 1965	53	71.7	90	55.6	302	80.5
Moderates	7	85.7	30	60.0		