

The Lengthened Shadow of Another Institution?

The Ideological Preferences of the Executive Branch, the House, and the Senate

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Abstract: Does the president appoint an ideologically congruent cabinet, or do strategic concerns imposed by the separation-of-powers induce divergence in policy preferences? To answer these questions, we estimate scale comparable ideal point estimates of U.S. senators, House representatives, federal cabinet secretaries, and presidents across time and institutions, presenting the first portraits of the ideological portfolio of the modern executive branch and its relationship to both House and Senate ideology. Our estimates cover the 15 Cabinet-level departments, presidents, and members of Congress from 1991-2004. They have been generated via an item response measurement model using legislators' roll-call positions, president's publicly revealed positions on legislative roll calls, and cabinet members' publicly revealed positions on legislative roll calls. We find, in contrast to extant theoretical work, that presidents appoint an ideologically diverse portfolio of officials to their cabinets. An empirical application utilizing these measures is presented, providing empirical support that budgetary authority is traded against department ideology in interbranch bargaining. Presidents are willing to appoint cabinet heads that are ideologically distant from the president and closer to pivotal players in Congress in order to garner increased budgetary authority for departments. Our estimates are of substantial use in a wide variety of empirical applications, as they allow for testing of questions of House-Senate relations within Congress as well as questions of political control of appointees by both the legislative and executive branches.

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An administrative chief may get an excellent idea or discover that a simple bill will solve a difficult problem. But sometimes he decides it is useless to try to get it through Congress because he fears 'those-so-and-so's on the Hill will never study the facts.' More often a legislator gets fragmentary information from a constituent, reads a few paragraphs in a newspaper or hears part of a broadcast, then forthwith...belabors some hapless official or fires oral broadsides at an entire department.

– *Estes Kefauver (1947, 97)*

When proposing an American version of Westminster “question time” in 1947, Representative William Thom (D-OH) argued that tighter legislative-executive policy relationships would lead to a “better cabinet” in which appointees would be selected “with the thought that they must be so trained in government that they could meet the challenges of the members” (quoted in Horn 1960, 137). Outside government, “the political scientists and public administrators...stated that our political machinery was devised for a simple agricultural society, but is no longer competent to resolve efficiently the issues imposed on government by the needs of a great industrial nation” (Kefauver 1944, 317). These comments suggest an interplay between presidents, their appointed Cabinet members, and members of Congress that run contrary to an implicit assumption or prediction of most recent work on the executive branch: ideological congruence of the president and the heads of executive branch agencies. In this paper, we argue that members of the U.S. Cabinet are consequential actors in the separation-of-powers system, and that as such, their preferences are sometimes quite distinct from their appointing presidents.¹ Further, the ideological preferences of these executive branch officials—in contrast with presidential and congressional ideology—have important consequences for public policy.

To capture this influence, we statistically estimate an ideological portrait—we call it an *ideological portfolio*—of the executive branch of the U.S. government. Specifically, we estimate the ideological positions of the cabinet, the president, and members of both chambers of Congress on a common scale for the period between 1991-2004. To do so, we use information revealed by

¹ For example, to begin his book on representation in the cabinet, Cohen (1988, 3) writes: “One may ask, why a book on the cabinet? The cabinet as a body is relatively powerless. It has no corporate responsibility, no ability to enforce decisions.” With Cohen, we argue that much can be learned by studying cabinet.

cabinet-level secretaries when testifying before Congress, similar to the interbranch dialogue described above. The scenario in which secretaries reveal information is costly, much like that of roll-call voting. Our estimates have been generated by estimating an item response model in a Bayesian framework (e.g., Bertelli and Grose 2009; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004; Martin and Quinn 2002). The novel estimates presented here are scale comparable across both time and the institutions of the president, individual Cabinet departments, the U.S. House, and the U.S. Senate.

This paper makes an important contribution to the empirical study of separation-of-powers politics. In providing an estimate of the ideological contours of the executive and legislative branches across four presidential terms of office, we generate data that can be employed by other scholars in a host of empirical tests of theories of appointments, political control of administration, legislative decision-making, and bureaucratic policymaking. To demonstrate the utility of our estimates for testing implications of theories, we provide an empirical application using the estimates: testing McCarty's (2004) theoretical claim of tradeoffs in presidential-legislative bargaining over appointments and budgetary authority. We find empirical support for this claim.

Comparable interbranch ideology estimates such as those at the core of this paper present a host of difficulties (see generally Bailey 2007, 434-438; Treier 2003). Only three published studies have attempted to statistically estimate the ideology of executive branch actors other than presidents (Nixon 2004; Clinton and Lewis 2007; Bertelli and Grose 2009).² Nixon (2004) estimates time-invariant "common space" scores (Poole 1998) for executive branch appointees who have served in Congress. While novel, this approach is limited to only those few executive branch officials who have also served in Congress, and more importantly, the approach

² Legion studies have, however, employed proxies for bureaucratic ideology of varying quality or made assumptions in particular policy areas (e.g., Scholz and Wei 1986; Krause 1996). In one example, Meier and O'Toole (2006, 181) use the percentages of Latino school board members and teachers in Texas school districts as proxies for each level's education policy ideology.

incorporates no information revealed by the administrative actors while holding the office for which the estimates are associated. Clinton and Lewis (2007, 3) use 26 responses to an elite survey of experts—the sampling frame included 30 scholars of bureaucratic politics, three journalists, two think-tank bureaucracy specialists, and two members of non-partisan government agencies—in a multi-rater item-response model to provide estimates of agency ideology. Like that in Nixon (2004), the Clinton-Lewis estimates tackle a thorny problem, yet the Lewis-Clinton estimates are not scale comparable to members of Congress or the president nor is there a clear temporal identification for these estimates. In assessing the validity of our method, we directly engage both of these techniques. Bertelli and Grose (2009) are the only to estimate ideal points over time for presidents, senators, and executive agencies, but they do not estimate positions of House members and they only examine two executive agencies. Finally, Bertelli et al. (2009) estimate scale-comparable positions for members of Congress and the executive branch based on an elite survey, but these estimates are also time-invariant as they focus only on the 109th Congress (2005-06).

To construct the estimates, we rely on information that is (a) revealed by cabinet secretaries ‘on the job;’ and (b) in situations where, as in roll-call voting, revealing preferences is costly to the actor doing the revealing. The estimates are based on the assumptions of the spatial model of voting (cf. Enelow and Hinich 1984; Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004), but we extend the logic of this model to executive actors who reveal their ideology through costly public announcements of support or opposition to legislation before Congress.

In the following section, we briefly examine the role of cabinet in the executive branch and detail theoretical accounts of the incentives that govern the president’s choice of cabinet members. We argue in contrast to much received wisdom that a president’s ideological portfolio of cabinet members is likely to be diverse. We then turn to our method of interbranch ideology measurement and present our estimates thereafter. After describing patterns in the estimates, we examine theoretical expectations regarding appointee ideology–budget tradeoffs in interbranch

bargaining (McCarty 2004). We conclude with some brief remarks and implications for future research.

The Executive Branch in the Separation of Powers

The role of the cabinet in policymaking has changed throughout the years, moving from the core to the periphery of those decisions at different times (Fenno 1959; Warshaw 1996). Presidential push-and-pull regarding cabinet involvement in policymaking has been instrumented through enhancements in the White House bureaucracy. An equilibrium seems to have resulted in which “[p]residents entered office committed to reducing the power of the White House staff, yet once in office could not maintain that commitment” (Warshaw 1996, 37). Lewis (2008, 2-3) describes President Nixon’s attempts to integrate policymaking given perceptions of a bureaucracy loyal to preceding Democratic administrations by permitting, for example, cabinet secretaries to select their own sub-cabinet nominees. Less than a year into his administration, frustrated that most secretaries had retained sub-cabinet staff from prior administrations and that his legislative program was meeting with little success, Nixon believed that the cabinet had “gone native” and reorganized the executive office to rein it in (Warshaw 1996, 59).

Moe (1995) argues that efforts to politicize administration in this way are a function of the general-interest link of the president to the electorate: the president is held accountable for the whole operation of government. This view suggests that politicization advantages a president in maintaining accountability for his policy program. Moe (1995, 239) has argued that “the modern president is driven by . . . formidable expectations to seek control over the structures and processes of government” (see also Lewis 2008). To do so, Moe (1995, 245) continues, the president will rely in significant part on the tactic of “appointing individuals on the basis of loyalty, ideology, or programmatic support.”³ Rudalevige and Lewis (2005, 8-9) claim that

³ The selection of loyal administrators is central to what Nathan (1983) called the “administrative presidency strategy” of crafting administrative compliance with presidential policy goals. Articulations of this strategy often have overtones of policy allegiance. Waterman (1989, 29) writes, for example, that after the creation in 1948 of the Office of Presidential Personnel, “presidents were in a better position to appoint

presidents trade off centralization—expanding the authority of the White House over cabinet—with politicization—filling posts with political and policy loyalists to enhance policy responsiveness. Centralization imposes *ex post* monitoring costs while politicization generates *ex ante* costs associated with the appointment process.⁴

These *ex ante* costs may differ between inner and outer cabinet agencies. Inner cabinet agencies—State, Treasury, Defense, and Justice—provide counsel on highly important and sensitive *national* issues, and the secretaries of those departments consequently forge “close collaborative relationships with presidents” (Cohen 1986, 133 quoting Cronin 1980, 277). By contrast, outer cabinet agencies “are plagued by strong interests that pull the secretary away from the president” (Cohen 1986, 123). “[T]he distinction between inner and outer cabinet departments,” Cohen continues, “is also a distinction between more and less powerful departments” (123). Appointees and control of inner and outer cabinet agencies may be expected to differ as well.

Scholars of the institutional presidency thus suggest that to understand cabinet, we must understand appointment incentives and the role of Congress. Yet various scholars have assumed or derived the equivalence of administrator and presidential ideal points in formal models of bureaucratic policy implementation (cf. Ferejohn and Shipan 1990; Horn 1995; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Volden 2002).⁵ Various delegation studies, quite unsurprisingly then, find that

individuals who shared their political philosophy” across the many appointments for which they had become responsible.

⁴ These include “finding appropriate appointees..., fending off cross-pressures from others unconcerned with presidential control but very concerned with who receives a given appointment; and of dealing with the possibility that politicized appointees are, on balance, less operationally competent, and with the political and public costs associated with politicized appointments, given that ‘control’ is usually used as an epithet, at least by those not doing the controlling” (Rudalevige and Lewis 2005, 9).

⁵ Ferejohn and Shipan (1990, 12) “analyze the special case in which the most preferred policy of the president is that of the agency.” Eschewing the top levels, Horn (1995, 10) assumed that bureaucrats “want to maximize some combination of lifetime income and leisure, which implies that they have no policy preferences per se.” Epstein and O’Halloran (1999, 60) find “in equilibrium, the president will always choose an agency head with policy preferences identical to her own . . . loyalty to the president’s goals will be the primary factor in choosing executive branch officials.” Volden (2002, 113) leaves agency

variants of the “ally principle”—when delegating, a principal chooses an agent whose preferences most closely reflect those of the principal—are supported in the case of cabinet agencies (see Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001; Bendor and Meirowitz 2004). By contrast, delegations might effectively be made to non-ally fiduciaries (e.g., Barro and Gordon 1983; Spulber and Besanko 1992).

In most theoretical and empirical work on appointments, political scientists have been primarily concerned with the independent commissions and agencies (see generally Hammond and Hill 1990; Nokken and Sala 2000; Snyder and Weingast 2000, but see McCarty and Razaghian 1999; McCarty 2004; Nixon 2004) due in part to interesting institutional constraints such as limitations on removal power, the presence of multiple members on the commissions, and partisanship requirements. Economists and political scientists have in this vein examined appointments to the Federal Reserve Board (Chappell, Havrilesky, and McGregor 1993; Keech and Morris 1997; Chang 2001). With the exception of Nokken and Sala (2000), which analyzes regimes of drift on independent agency boards—policy movement by line bureaucrats in “left,” “zero,” or “right” directions from a board decision—these studies take virtually no account of how administrators implement policy once in office. As such, one popular modeling choice has been that agents act as unilateral policy implementers. Bertelli and Feldmann (2007) show that when an administrative agency is influenced by interest groups during policy implementation, the ally principle does not follow when that influence is characterized as a simple negotiation. In the presence of such influence, presidents are better served by appointing administrators whose ideological leanings partially compensate for the influence of organized interests during policy implementation.

preferences exogenous, arguing that “[i]n reality, presidents...cannot set and perfectly control agency preferences.” In the case of executive (including cabinet-level) agencies, Volden (2002, 131) assumes “executive and agency alignment” in preferences. Volden (2002, 114, n.4) notes that if the president’s choice of appointee were endogenous in his model, that appointee would be chosen such that her preferences are aligned with those of the president.

A third reason for the failure of ideological congruence lies in a strategic balancing of legislative and executive mechanisms for bureaucratic control. Cabinet heads and agencies generally are agents with multiple principals, both the president and Congress (e.g., Bertelli and Grose 2009; Gailmard 2007; Whitford 2005). Nixon (2004) points out that presidents are constrained in their choice of appointee by the Congress. The Senate's power over the appointee is both via initial confirmation and *ex post* oversight powers. Nixon argues that presidents are constrained by the location of the senate veto pivot when nominating federal appointees, offering one explanation for why administrative and presidential preferences may not be equivalent. Bertelli and Grose (2007) also find that the key senate oversight committee is an important predictor of Cabinet-member disagreement with presidents. While the House does not have appointment powers, it can potentially exert political control over federal departments through oversight, budgetary and appropriation powers. Appointed department heads are often situated between competing principals: pivotal House members, pivotal senators, and the president.

Endogenizing appointments in a budgetary control model with a unilateral policy setting agent, McCarty (2004, 413) formally examines what he calls "the appointments dilemma" in which Congress has little formal power over personnel and the president has few powers beyond appointment and dismissal that are not "largely derived from statutes for which his formal role in formulation is limited to the executive veto." In bargaining with the Congress over agency budgets, the McCarty (2004, 415) results turn on whether the president—as head of executive agencies—can "commit to not changing the agency's ideal point after the budget has been allocated but before policy has been set by the agency." If the president can commit to a moderate appointee, the legislature anticipates less opportunism by the executive and responds with higher budgetary authority. If the president cannot make that commitment, the agency responds with more restricted budgetary authority.

McCarty (2004, 415) makes the critical assumption that commitment is more difficult "if the agency head serves at the president's will." Thus, cabinet-level agencies provide a strong test

of his theory, since finding evidence of anticipatory budgeting on the part of the legislature to hedge against executive opportunism *ex post* in executive agencies would suggest that the removal power is weaker than generally expected. We provide statistical evidence below that these ideology-budget tradeoffs are being made.

The President's Moral Hazard

Taken together, these theories suggest that cabinet presents the president with the various risks of moral hazard. When the president redistributes the risk of not following through on his policy program by entrusting cabinet members with implementing various aspects of it, cabinet members may direct agency policymaking in ways that contradict the president's intended program. The president thus has the incentive to fire them or centralize authority in the White House to rein them in (Lewis 2008; Rudalevige 2002; Warshaw 1996) leading to policy (Spulber and Besanko 1992) and interbranch (McCarty 2004) commitment problems. Secretaries may drift from the president's program by going native (possible in both the inner and outer cabinet) or by responding to the organized constituent interests of their departments (more likely in the outer cabinet) (Cronin 1980; Cohen 1986).

Anticipating policy drift, the president can mitigate moral hazard by considering the context of policy making. In the case of the outer cabinet, the influence of constituent groups in policy implementation is mitigated by strategically choosing a non-ally (Bertelli and Feldmann 2007). Given the influence of resources over what might be accomplished in a policy area (see Ting 2001), should the president prefer more (or less) resources for a policy area, he can choose an agent with policy views that moderate his own policy preferences with those of Congress (or an ally).

Though the outcome of the president's resource bargaining with Congress hinges on commitment to agent ideology, some policy areas require non-ally agents to make commitments to particular policies credible on the president's part simply because of the nature of the policy being implemented (see Barro and Gordon 1983 on central banks). In those cases, the appointee

chosen reflects the ideology of the policy to which the president wishes to commit his administration, rather than a strategic position to leverage his own ideal outcome.

All of these appointees are subject to the confirmation of the Senate. Though the Senate gives “advice and consent” to appointments, “there is a general norm that the president should get the cabinet that he wants” (Cohen 1988, 10). Mackenzie (1981, 177-78) notes that this norm may yield when senators view the nominee as problematic for reasons of policy difference, conflicts of interest, as well as specific personal characteristics. Presidents consider the political firestorm that can be a nomination fight when they choose nominees—as nominees do when they decline offers of cabinet appointments—by mixing considerations of skill and ideology. Said President-elect Harding,

Three things are to be considered in the selection of a Cabinet. First, there is the man’s qualification for public service. This is the most important consideration of all. Second, there is the attitude of the public concerning men under consideration. Third, there is the political consideration. As to that—well, this is going to be a Republican Cabinet you may count on that, and you may be sure it will be a Cabinet of which the whole country may be proud. You can put that in black type and a box. (Quoted in Fenno 1959, 65).

Presidents must also consider the threat, however unlikely, that Senate rejection may occur, and models endogenizing appointments typically consider this hazard (see, e.g., Bertelli and Feldmann 2007; McCarty 2004; Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast 1989). Krutz, Bond, and Fleisher (1998, 872) argue that the veto threat can become more credible when Senate “policy entrepreneurs” portray a negative image of a nominee and use institutions such as the “hold” rule and persuasion to “expand the conflict to persuade senators to see controversy.” The Senate, given the credibility of their veto threat, seems to play a role in pulling cabinet secretarial appointments away from the president’s ideal point. Indeed, Volden (2002, 113) anticipates that “the agency’s position is...likely to be somewhere between” that of Congress and the president when making the agency’s ideal policy exogenous to his model. But as we have seen, the various risks of moral hazard suggest that the result is not necessarily a weighted average.

In sum, presidents and cabinet secretaries may be ideologically distinct. This is so, we claim, because multiple factors underlie the revealed ideology of legislators, presidents, and cabinet secretaries. In choosing how to vote on proposed legislation, House members and senators face the influence of the voters in their districts and states, partisan pressures, and their own ideologies (cf. Levitt 1996; Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Presidents take positions on roll-call votes, for example, to reinforce and clarify for Congress their policy preferences and to sway undecided members of Congress on vote choices (Shull 1997). Their revealed preferences are likewise influenced by voter ideology in the coalition of states required to garner an electoral-college victory, party pressure, and personal ideology. We claim that the ideology of the appointing president, of bureaucratic subordinates, and personal ideology influence cabinet secretaries' positions on policy proposals before Congress.

The Ideological Portfolio of the Executive Branch

Celebrating its role after his term of office, Thomas Jefferson remarked that with the institution of cabinet, the nation had “fallen on the happiest of all modes of constituting the executive, that of easing and aiding our President, by permitting him to choose secretaries of state, of finance, of war, and of the navy, with whom he may advise, separately or all together, and remedy their decisions by adopting or controlling their opinions at his discretion” (quoted in Learned 1912, 47-48). The theories we have reviewed summarily suggest that the president's moral hazard concerns make cabinet, in Fenno's (1959, 5) words, “(to twist Emerson) the lengthened shadow of another institution—the Presidency...It lives in a state of institutional dependency to promote the effective exercise of the President's authority and to help implement his ultimate responsibilities.”

Cabinet secretaries and the president together form the *ideological portfolio* of the executive branch. In parliamentary systems, the selection of cabinet officials is a function of the credible commitment to a specific policy program, i.e., “a proposal that promises to enact the preferred policy position of the person (party) nominated for each relevant [policy area] is

credible in the sense that it depends only on giving ministers the power to do what they expressly want to do” (Laver and Shepsle 1990, 874).⁶ Given the role of cabinet in implementing the president’s policy program, appointing a liberal Secretary of Education does not in the same way commit the president to liberal education policies.⁷ The “appointments dilemma” of shared presidential and legislative control over bureaucratic policy making and the president’s response to it yields a scenario in which cross-policy tradeoffs may be made to improve the likelihood of implementing the president’s program. The result, we anticipate, is a nuanced ideological portfolio, not a cadre of presidential clones.

Having argued that there are incentives for members of the Cabinet to be ideologically distinct from the president, we present a statistical picture of this portfolio—something never before quantitatively estimated.

Comparable Ideal Point Estimates for the Executive and Congress

Scholars interested in a statistical understanding of the ideological portfolios of the executive branch and the legislative branch face two major problems. First, ideal point estimation for federal appointees, the executive, House members, and senators has been nearly intractable due to scale comparability problems (for a discussion, see e.g., Bailey 2007; Bailey and Chang 2001; Chang 2001). Most ideal point estimates of legislators are ascertained by scaling roll-call votes (e.g., Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004; Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder 1999; Poole 1998; Poole and Rosenthal 1997; Martin and Quinn 2002; Treier 2003). In the language of item response theory, which we employ below, the roll call-level parameters are assumed to be comparable across actors. Prior work attempting to overcome scale comparability across institutions has used roll-call positions as a bridge for presidents and legislators (McCarty and

⁶ Note that we do not use the term “portfolio” to denote an individual policy jurisdiction, as do Laver and Shepsle (1990) and other scholars of parliamentary systems. Our use of portfolio compares to that used in finance: we mean the *overall* range of ideologies represented in the executive branch (as financial analysts mean the range of investments held by an individual investor).

⁷ Note that implementation may differ when, for instance, a secretary is more liberal than his/her appointing president (Bertelli and Grose 2009).

Poole 1995; Treier 2008) and roll-call and publicly expressed positions as bridges for presidents, legislators, and the courts (Bailey 2007). When presidents publicly express positions on roll calls, they engage in politically costly behavior as their views on a public policy are now known and media accounts, public opinion, and other responses are conditioned on the information they reveal. In recording a roll-call vote, members of Congress similarly take positions in a costly environment, making the comparability of the roll-call parameters a reasonable assumption.

These costs of public preference revelation relate to accountability: the electorate holds the president and members of Congress accountable for their positions and can turn those individuals out of office for policy choices that do not comport with those of the characteristic voter. The venue of congressional testimony similarly imposes costs on cabinet secretaries, albeit in a more indirect fashion. A Cabinet member's accountability flows through the president (via removal power) and Congress (via budgetary and statutory authority) and dissent from the positions taken by either institution is essential in understanding the ideologies of secretaries as they perform their policy-making tasks. Like roll-call votes, public positions may also reveal personal preferences. We bridge the executive and legislative branches by identifying these presidential and cabinet positions on roll calls voted on before Congress. Scale comparability problems are not limited to executive actors, as we are interested in placing House and Senate actors on the same ideological dimension as well. To do this, we utilize legislators that have served in both chambers during the time period examined as bridges between the House and Senate (as Poole and Rosenthal have done with their "common space" estimates).

A second measurement problem facing scholars interested in Cabinet ideal point estimates is that there has been no readily available data on revealed preferences of administrators. Unlike the study of Congress and the courts, there has been no equivalent to the DW-NOMINATE estimates of ideal points in Congress (Poole and Rosenthal 1997), the Martin and Quinn (2001) estimates of ideal points in the Supreme Court, and the Bailey (2007) estimates of the courts and Congress. Those interested in testing theories of executive-legislative

interactions, the separation of powers, or the bureaucracy have not had adequate measures of all relevant actors' ideal points. Separate from the scale comparability problem described above, these data limitations have caused the scientific study of the bureaucracy to be weighted heavily toward formal modeling and analytical narratives. We overcome this problem by identifying numerous, scale comparable positions taken by department heads in the 15 Cabinet-level executive agencies. Our data are drawn from a content analysis of congressional testimony by the secretaries of all 15 departments to either chamber of the 102nd through 108th Congresses. These documents were collected through a search of the NEXIS Congressional Universe testimony database, which stores nearly all testimonies before Congress from 1991-2004 (matching to the 102nd – 108th Congresses). The time period is limited to 1991-2004 as the testimonies are not consistently available in the database prior to 1990. In total, we coded tens of thousands of pages of testimony transcripts totaling billions of words. For instance, we coded 3216 pages of testimony transcripts totaling 1,472,654 words only for the positions garnered for the Secretaries of Defense. Each testimony was searched for any mention of legislation. Each mention was cross-referenced to House and Senate roll calls in the Congress in which the testimony was delivered.

References by Cabinet officials to legislation debated in a Congress in which the Secretary was not testifying were excluded to ensure temporal matching of issues across institutional actors, which is consistent with existing techniques for measuring presidential positions. The costs of supporting bills that have passed or failed in prior congresses tend toward zero—amounting to ‘cheap talk’ in strategic terms—and do not facilitate the types of comparisons we wish to make. It is important to note that policy positions taken publicly by the cabinet members span issues well beyond the specific jurisdiction of the secretary's department. For instance, Secretary of Treasury Robert Rubin took positions on welfare reform legislation in the 104th Congress; Secretary of Labor Robert Reich took a position on the 1994 crime bill; and Secretary of Housing and Urban Development Mel Martinez publicly supported the No Child

Left Behind Act, an education bill, during the 107th Congress. We excluded several Cabinet members from the analysis given a very small number of positions (less than five).⁸ In all, we generated 46 ideal point estimates for cabinet members and a total of 3,855 estimates for all actors (presidents, senators, House members, and cabinet secretaries) between the 102nd and 108th Congresses. A fuller discussion of the data and estimation is included in the appendix.

Results: Ideal Point Estimates

To assess the results of the measurement model, we will present a few snapshots of the data and estimates. In addition to posterior means, which are the ideal point estimates presented here, we also estimated the 95 percent Highest Posterior Density (HPD) regions for each actor to assess uncertainty.⁹

We begin by depicting the ideological portfolio from the 103rd Congress (1993-94) and the 107th Congress (2003-04) to assess the location of cabinet secretaries relative to presidents and pivotal members of Congress in the periods in which the new administrations were formed.¹⁰ In Figure 1, we display President Clinton's and President George W. Bush's entire cabinet (for which we have estimates) during the Congresses concurrent with the start of each president's first term. Each cabinet secretary is designated with a dot ("•") in Figure 1, while "P" indicates the

⁸ Instances of infrequent cabinet secretary position-taking occurred when (1) the secretary was appointed or resigned during the Congress, thus providing few opportunities for congressional testimonies and thus providing few positions on roll calls; (2) because the secretary simply did not take many public positions (e.g., Secretaries of Commerce tended to take few positions generally); or (3) in a few instances, because the NEXIS congressional universe database contained few testimonies (e.g., some of the earlier testimonies from the 102nd Congress/G.H.W. Bush administration were not entirely covered in the NEXIS database).

⁹ In the figures, we do not display the HPD regions for the sake of simplicity (especially in Figure 1). However, a large majority of the HPD regions for the Cabinet secretaries do not overlap with the president or with the key members of Congress displayed in the figures.

¹⁰ Because we were only able to estimate some of the Cabinet secretaries for the George H.W. Bush administration in the 102nd Congress (see appendix), and H.W. Bush's administration was initially appointed in the 101st Congress, we only present George W. Bush and Bill Clinton's administrative ideological portfolios in Figure 1.

location of the president's ideal point estimate. The Senate median ("SM"), the Senate filibuster pivot ("SFP"), and the House median ("HM") are also designated in Figure 1.¹¹

It appears that the ideological portfolios of presidents are diverse, and that cabinet secretaries' revealed preferences are not all near the president's own ideological position. In the 103rd Congress, about six of the appointed agency heads are clustered near President Clinton's ideal point estimate, while a little more than half are relatively distant from the president and clustered near pivotal congressional actors. In the 107th Congress, Bush's cabinet secretaries display a substantial amount of ideological diversity as well. A few are on the right (near the president), while the majority are located near the center-right (by the House median). However, two of Bush's most moderate appointees are located at the same locations of some of Clinton's most conservative appointees.

Interestingly, neither the location of the president's ideal point nor the locations of the pivotal members of Congress dominate the locations of the cabinet secretaries. Though not reported in Figure 1, the 95% HPD regions for the cabinet secretaries suggest that over 80 percent of the cabinet ideal point estimates do not overlap with their appointing presidents.

We continue assessing whether divergence between cabinet secretaries and presidents occur by examining the absolute distance between presidential ideal point estimates and cabinet secretary ideal point estimates across different variables. In Figure 2, we display kernel densities of president-agency distances across the three presidential administrations for which we have data; the y-axis is the density and x-axis displays the absolute distance between president and secretary so that secretary-president divergence would indicate fewer observations on the left side of the x-axis. As can be seen in Figure 2, all three presidents appoint cabinet secretaries that are divergent from presidential preferences. The H.W. Bush administration has more divergence

¹¹ In the 107th Congress, the filibuster pivot is assumed to be the 60th senator moving from the right to the left as the Republicans were in the majority in the opening months of the 107th Senate when Bush's appointees were confirmed. The change in majority party control resulting from Sen. Jim Jefford's switch from Republican to independent occurred in May 2001, after Bush's cabinet confirmations were made.

among department heads and the president than do the Clinton and G.W. Bush administrations. Interestingly, the second Bush administration does not display substantially more or less loyalty – as measured by ideal point estimate divergence – than the Clinton administration.

In Figure 3, we show similar figures, though this time displaying the densities for the president-secretary absolute distances by inner and outer cabinet (pooling all data across administrations). As can be seen, and somewhat contrary to expectations, the inner cabinet departments of Defense, Justice, State, and Treasury appear to have about the same amount of preference divergence from the president as outer cabinet departments.

In Figure 4, we examine one more hypothesis about preference divergence between president and agent. Here we display two kernel densities, one for cabinet secretaries appointed when the president and the Senate were controlled by the same party (unified government) and the other for cabinet secretaries appointed when the president and Senate were controlled by opposite parties (divided government). As expected by multiple principals theories and appointments theories of political control, distance between secretaries and presidents is most common when the secretaries were appointed under divided government.

FIGURES 1-4 ABOUT HERE

The agency estimates in Figure 1 generally (though not exclusively) fall within the region between the president and the senate filibuster pivot in both the Bush and Clinton administrations. Furthermore, Figures 2-4 suggest there is divergence between presidents and secretaries, but the conditions under which this divergence occurs differs among different regimes. This suggests that ideological dissonance from the president occurs among secretaries, yet the president also seems to maintain some control over his administrators. Our estimates suggest that theoretical accounts that assume that president and agency preferences are equivalent (e.g., (Ferejohn and Shipan 1990) only hold in some cases. The inverse is also apparent: our empirical results suggest that theoretical accounts positing that the ideal points of congressional actors such as the senate median (Nixon 2004) are equivalent to agency ideal points may only hold in certain agencies. A

multiple-principals account of political control of agents incorporating both the president and members of Congress is suggested by the arrangement of the ideal point estimates.

In Figure 5, we examine two individual inner cabinet departments across time, and compare the executive branch ideal point estimates to key congressional committee chairs. The ideal point estimates for the secretaries of state (Warren Christopher, Madeleine Albright, and Colin Powell) and defense (William Perry, William Cohen, and Donald Rumsfeld) serving from the 103rd through the 108th Congresses are displayed, as are President Clinton's and Bush's locations. The ideal point estimate of the chair of the Senate Foreign Relations committee is indicated with an asterisk and the ideal point estimate of the House Foreign Affairs committee chair is indicated with an X in Figure 5.

In general, Figure 5 suggests there has been a rightward shift as measured by the ideal point estimates of these key institutional actors across the time period, 1991-2004. Over the entire time period, though, there is a core set of actors, generally considered foreign policy moderates, located at the center of the ideological dimension. Perry, Cohen, Albright, and Powell are all relatively close to one another, as is House Foreign Affairs Chair Benjamin Gilman (R-NY). Comparing Powell (Secretary of State in the 107th-108th Congresses) to the secretaries serving in the Clinton administration in the 103rd Congress (Christopher, Perry) and the locations of the congressional committee chairs in the 103rd Congress (Claiborne Pell, D-RI; and Lee Hamilton, D-IN), Powell is slightly to the right of all these Clinton-era decision-makers. By the 108th Congress, though, Powell is the most liberal key actor in foreign policy-decision-making in the United States, as Rumsfeld, Bush, and the two congressional committee chairs (Dick Lugar, R-IN and Henry Hyde, R-IL) are to his right. This pattern uncovered by our estimates is generally consistent with qualitative accounts of Powell's ideological location relative to others in the Bush administration (Woodward 2006).

FIGURES 5 AND 6 ABOUT HERE

To exemplify the utility of our data for testing questions of congressional oversight of federal departments, Figure 6 presents the locations of the Banking/Financial Services committee chairs in the House and Senate for the 107th Congress (2001-02) and the 108th Congress (2003-04), and the secretaries of two departments that these committees have jurisdiction over: the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The Senate Banking committee chair is indicated by an asterisk (Paul Sarbanes, D-MD, is the chair in the 107th and Richard Shelby, R-AL, is the chair in the 108th Congress), while the House Financial Services Chair is indicated by an X (Michael Oxley, R-OH, chaired the committee in both Congresses).¹² In Figure 6, the Treasury Secretaries (Paul O’Neill, 107th Congress; John Snow, 108th Congress) and the HUD Secretaries (Mel Martinez, 107th Congress; Alphonso Jackson, 107th Congress) are indicated with circles and triangles, respectively. We also display the Treasury Secretary in the 106th Congress, Larry Summers, as a reference point to compare a Democratic appointee to these Republican appointees.

It is apparent that the HUD secretaries (both appointed by Republican George W. Bush) are moderately conservative, as they are far to the right of Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) and slightly to the right of Larry Summers, yet are to the left of the two Republican-appointed Treasury secretaries and to the left of Oxley and Shelby. Given HUD’s policy portfolio, the likelihood that its lower-level bureaucrats working within these departments are liberal (Bertelli et al. 2009; Clinton and Lewis 2007), and the possibility that appointees “go native;” it is not surprising that the HUD secretary ideal point estimates would be to the left of the Treasury secretary ideal point estimates, even in a Republican administration.

As one might expect, President Bush replaced Treasury secretary O’Neill and HUD secretary Martinez with more conservative individuals in the 108th Congress. O’Neill himself details that he and Bush frequently clashed (Suskind 2004), while Martinez’s relatively moderate

¹² Sarbanes was the chair of the committee during the time period in which the Democrats were in the majority of the 107th Senate (May 2001 through the end of the 107th Congress).

ideological position as HUD secretary may be explained by his ambition to run for the U.S. Senate in the “swing” state of Florida.

In sum, Figures 1 through 3 also provide some face validity to the estimates, but they detail only a few of the ideal point estimates of the 3 presidents, 46 cabinet secretaries, and 3806 members of Congress that scholars will find useful in testing implications of theories of executive and legislative politics. In a future iteration of the paper, we plan to validate these estimates quantitatively by correlating them with an expert survey of the ideological locations of executive agencies and presidents, as well as correlating them with extant measures of Congress.

We have claimed that our estimates will be useful for testing a number of theoretical predictions arising from separation-of-powers models. In what follows, we present an empirical application utilizing our estimates to test one implication of a formal model of executive-legislative interactions.

Application: “The Appointments Dilemma”

McCarty (2004, 416) models the interbranch competition in political control of agency policymaking as a bargaining game between a legislature and president. In the case of executive agencies, the process begins with a legislative proposal of a specified amount of budgetary authority for the agency, which the president may accept or reject. The president also appoints an agency head, which the legislature may confirm or reject. The agency then selects a policy. He specifies appointments to executive agencies as a take-it-or-leave-it offer to capture a scenario in which “the president cannot commit *not* to use his removal power to change the agency’s ideal point” (415).¹³ The preference of each actor—legislature and president—for an agency head at its own ideal point follows (417). In budgetary negotiations for executive agencies, McCarty (2004, 471-418) shows that the legislature’s optimal budgetary authority for the agency is a decreasing

¹³ This commitment problem follows from the Supreme Court’s vesting of unrestricted removal power in the president in *Myers v. United States*, 272 U.S. 52 (1926) that was subsequently limited *only* in the case of independent agencies in *Humphrey’s Executor v. United States*, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) and *Weiner v. United States*, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).

function of the distance between the ideal points of the appointed agency head and legislature. We empirically examine this proposition.

We estimate a regression model where the unit of analysis is the agency-year dyad, and we examine budgetary decisions by Congress for each year from 1991-2004 for each agency for which we have Cabinet ideal point estimates and other appropriate data are available. The data for the dependent variable are drawn from the Public Budget Database compiled by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). We examine *discretionary budget authority* (in billions of dollars) as the dependent variable since the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 refers to funds not otherwise made mandatory in extant law, and these funds are appropriated annually in congressionally chosen amounts. This is our measure of the optimal budget level for the legislature, given the location of the agency's ideal point. Budget authority amounts are matched with our ideal point measures by comparing the actors' estimates for the fiscal year in which funds were appropriated.

The implications of the McCarty (2004) model suggest that the president is willing to appoint an executive agent away from his ideal point if the result is a change in the agency's budget. A president hoping for higher budgets for an agency will choose to appoint a department head closer to Congress, and off of his own ideal point. Somewhat counter-intuitively, increasing absolute distances between the president and Congress will result in larger budgets, and smaller president-legislative distances imply smaller agency budgets. A second implication of the model is that smaller spatial distances between Congress's ideal point and the agency's ideal point will yield higher budgets, while larger distances will yield smaller budgets.

The first variable is *Agency-President distance*, which is measured as $|X_A - X_P|$, where X_A is the ideal point estimate of the agency and X_P is the ideal point estimate of the president. Smaller values of this variable suggest cabinet heads close in ideology to the president, while larger values indicate ideological noncongruence with the president. While McCarty's model (2004) assumes a unicameral legislature for simplicity, we include two variables measuring

distance between an agency and each chamber of Congress. The second variable of interest is *Agency-House median distance*, $|X_A - X_H|$, where X_A is, once again, the agency ideal point estimate and X_H is the ideal point estimate of the House floor median. The third variable is *Agency-Senate median distance*, $|X_A - X_S|$, where X_A is, the agency ideal point estimate and X_H is the ideal point estimate of the Senate floor median. Since annual appropriations bills are not subject to filibuster, we examine the Senate median. We expect that as the values of the House and Senate variables increase, agency budgets will decrease. Also, since the theory focuses on appointments, it is possible that only the senate-agency distance variable will be a significant predictor of budget authority as the Senate must approve cabinet appointments, while the House does not. To capture unobserved aspects of budget bargaining for particular agencies, we also include fixed effects for *agency* (omitting the Department of Agriculture for reference).

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

Results are shown in table 2. As is immediately apparent, the model supports the McCarty (2004) expectations for departmental budgetary authority in executive agencies. The *Agency-President distance* variable is statistically significant and in the expected direction. An absolute spatial distance of 1.0 between the agency and the president results in about \$5 billion more in funding for the agency than if the president and the agency were ideologically congruent. This result suggests that presidents have incentives to appoint ideologically dissimilar agency heads in order to maximize agency budgets, supporting Bertelli and Feldmann (2007) and McCarty (2004).

The *Agency-Senate median distance* variable is also statistically significant, and is, as expected, negative. The closer the agency's ideal point estimate to the senate median's ideal point, the greater the discretionary budget authority. In the model, going from a distance of 1.0 between senate and agency ideal points to 0.0 results in an increase in appropriations of over 20 billion dollars to an agency. We do not imply that these are causal effects, but the results present striking evidence of the tradeoffs made in appointment bargaining.

Interestingly, the *Agency-House median* distance variable is not a statistically significant predictor of budget authority. This finding—in tandem with the significant effect of the senate median variable—supports theoretical accounts focusing on the strategic relationships between appointment powers and legislative action on budgets.

Conclusion

We have provided the first statistical picture of the ideological portfolios of the executive branch of the U.S. government and its relationship to both chambers of the U.S. Congress. Our estimates provide new data of interest to a variety of fields, from legislative studies and the presidency to bureaucratic politics, public policy, and public administration. Our estimates suggest that the ally principle, so important to the politicized presidency, is not uniquely warranted when attempting to understand executive appointments even at the cabinet level. Contrary to the assumptions of a number of theories and the conventional scholarly wisdom, ideological positions of Cabinet members are often not the same as their appointing presidents (even though presidents retain the power of removal of appointees). Our applications demonstrate the influence of the Senate's role in confirmation and the tradeoffs made in presidential-congressional bargaining over the political control of policymaking. In doing so, we illustrate the complexity of executive and legislative politics and its importance to both theoretical and empirical scholarship in American politics.

Our estimates constitute the first space-and-time comparable estimates for the Senate, the House, and multiple institutional actors within the executive branch, making their utility to future scholars quite substantial. Among their potential applications are the impact of ideology on confirmation times, the duration of cabinet service, and the implementation of geographic-specific policies by cabinet departments to senators' constituencies.

Potential applications also abound for legislative scholars. Questions regarding the extent of discretion granted to specific agencies (and to which agencies) by Congress can be tested using our estimates. Tests of legislative oversight of the bureaucracy by congressional committees can

be conducted to determine whether more hearings are held when agencies are out-of-step with their congressional principals. Also, for those policy areas where there is substantial discretion granted to federal departments for policy implementation, the agency ideal point estimates might even be considered suitable measures of the status quo policy positions in spatial models analyzing congressional decision-making. One could test preference, party, and pivotal politics models of congressional decision-making using our estimates.

Our manuscript answers the call for scholars to study American political institutions by incorporating both branches of Congress, the president, and the bureaucracy into a unified analysis of policy-making. Bond and Fleisher (1990) and Krehbiel (1998) have argued for the importance of including all pivotal legislative and executive actors in the policy-making process. We further this call by suggesting that all pivotal actors in the bureaucracy, presidency, Senate, and House be included when formulating theories and conducting empirical tests. Understanding policy-making in a bicameral legislature goes forward by not only incorporating the preferences of the Senate and the House, but also by incorporating presidential preferences and agency preferences.

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
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
Figure 1: Ideological Portfolios of the G.W. Bush and Clinton Administrations and Pivotal Members of Congress, 103rd and 107th Congresses




- = Agency/Cabinet Secretary
- = President
- ◇ = Senate Median
- ◇ = Senate Filibuster Pivot
- ◇ = House Median

Figure 2: Absolute Distance Between Presidents and Cabinet Secretaries by Administration (Kernel Densities)

H.W. Bush:



Clinton:



G.W. Bush:





Figure 3: Absolute Distance Between Presidents and Cabinet Secretaries by Inner and Outer Cabinet (Kernel Densities)

Inner Cabinet:



Outer Cabinet:





Figure 4: Absolute Distance Between Presidents and Cabinet Secretaries by Unified Government and Divided Government (Kernel Densities)

Cabinet secretaries appointed under unified government:



Cabinet secretaries appointed under divided government:




Figure 5: Pivotal Actors in Foreign Policy in the Executive and Legislative Branches, 103rd-108th Congresses




Figure 6: Treasury, HUD, and Banking Committees in the House and Senate, 2001-2004




Table 1: The Effect of Secretary Ideology on Budgetary Authority, FY 1992-2005

<i>Dep. Var.: Discretionary Budgetary Authority (in billions)</i>	<i>Coefficient (s.e.)</i>
Agency-president distance, $ X_A - X_P $	5.268* (2.460)
Agency-Senate med. distance, $ X_A - X_S $	-20.970* (11.877)
Agency-House med. distance, $ X_A - X_H $	11.601 (9.420)
Commerce	-16.108* (2.031)
Defense‡	249.739* (7.795)
Education	30.523* (4.484)
Energy	-8.633* (1.570)
HHS	-1.957 (1.670)
Homeland Security	-7.137* (1.585)
HUD	-9.873* (1.590)
Justice	-7.581* (1.630)
Labor	22.751* (4.628)
State	1.841 (1.961)
Transportation	-6.727* (1.649)
Veterans Affairs	28.881 (14.786)
Interior	6.056* (2.129)
Treasury	0.809 (1.399)
Constant	16.463* (2.027)
N	152
R ²	0.98

Robust standard errors in parentheses; omitted agency is Agriculture.

* $p < 0.05$; one-tailed tests for spatial distance variables, two-tailed tests for agency variables.

Source: Public Budget Database, OMB

‡Defense department budgetary authority includes military only per Public Budget Database.

Appendix: Estimation of the Measurement Model

All agency heads for which sufficient positions were available for estimation are listed in the table A1, along with their appointing presidents and the date they were confirmed by the U.S. Senate. For House representatives and senators, with the exception of those legislators used as bridges across both chambers, we generate ideal point estimates for each legislator-congress dyad. Because the executive actors (Cabinet secretaries and presidents) do not take positions on every roll-call vote held before Congress, we estimated only one ideal point for cabinet members and presidents based on their entire period of service. This provides greater precision for many executive actors' ideal point estimates by incorporating more data used to generate the revealed preference estimates.¹⁴ For instance, Secretary of Education Richard Riley (D-Clinton Cabinet) served during all four Congresses concurrent with the Clinton administration (103rd-106th); we use 74 positions from 1993-2000 to estimate his time-invariant ideal point. Correspondingly, four ideal points for Representative Tillie Fowler (R-FL), who served for the same period, are estimated for each of the four Congresses.¹⁵

The total number of positions taken by all 46 Cabinet secretaries totaled 2701 with a mean of 58.7 positions per secretary. Robert Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury at the beginning of the Clinton administration, took the most positions on congressional roll calls (262), and Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher took the fewest (6). Of course, the uncertainty estimates will be larger for those actors taking few public roll-call positions, though this uncertainty is due to their public silence.

¹⁴ In unreported results, we also estimated cabinet secretary and president ideal points that varied by Congress within one actor. These results were generally similar to those presented here, though with greater uncertainty about the executive actors' estimates.

¹⁵ For members of Congress who later go on to serve in the Cabinet, we have separate estimates for their service in each Congress and their service in the Cabinet. In the case where a person moves from one Cabinet position to a second Cabinet position (e.g., Federico Pena, both Secretary of Transportation and Energy in the Clinton administration), we estimate two ideal points for each Cabinet department.

A single data matrix including all roll calls in the 102nd through 108th Congresses where each senator or House member has voted yea, nay, or has abstained provides the data for our measurement model. Bill endorsements by the president and secretary are also coded as yeas, while positions against the bill under consideration by the president and secretary are coded as nay votes. No position taken by the president or administrator is treated as an abstention.¹⁶ Consider the example of George W. Bush as president and Colin Powell as the Secretary of State. Though neither Bush nor Powell were “voting” on legislation, they revealed positions, as we have argued, in a scenario comparable to legislators’ positions in roll-call voting. In the case of abstention, estimates are based only upon votes/positions taken (we do not impute missing data); this is consistent with existing treatment of abstention by legislators and presidents in other ideal point models. The matrix includes 12,684 votes cast by all legislators serving from the 102nd through 108th Congresses.¹⁷ Including the three presidents and 46 cabinet secretaries serving during this time period, 3855 actors cast votes or took public positions.

For identification of the model across the Congresses and chambers, most legislators that served in both the House and the Senate are held constant across time; these legislators serve as the bridge (in addition to the executive actors) across the U.S. House and U.S. Senate and this identification strategy is similar to that used in Poole and Rosenthal’s common space estimates of the House and Senate.¹⁸ For scale identification, we do not allow estimates for two legislators who served in both chambers over the entire time period – Jon Kyl (R-AZ) and Barbara Boxer (D-CA) – to vary. Kyl and Boxer served throughout our sample and were respectively well

¹⁶ No position also includes the observations in the roll-call matrix where an actor was not serving.

¹⁷ There are more than 100 senators and more than 435 House members represented in the data set in most Congresses as some legislators are replaced mid-Congress due to death or resignation. For instance, during the 106th Congress, following the death of Paul Coverdell (R-GA), Zell Miller (D-GA) was appointed as an interim replacement. Senators who switched party affiliation during a Congress are recorded as separate legislators in the matrix as a member of each party.

¹⁸ There were a few legislators that served in both chambers that we did not hold constant, such as Sen. Ben Nighthorse Campbell, because their voting records changed dramatically during the time period overlapping with the 102nd through 108th Congresses.

known for consistently conservative and liberal positions.¹⁹ Our measurement model is that of Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004), based on a random Euclidean preference function with an error component. Following Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers (2004), we estimate the ideal points in a Bayesian framework (cf. Bailey 2007; Bertelli and Grose 2009; Martin and Quinn 2002).²⁰

We use vague priors to estimate the ideal points of most actors in the measurement model. For identification of the unidimensional scale, we constrain estimates of the latent trait for Boxer and Kyl to lie at opposing ends of the scale using “spike priors” with a prior mean of -1 and an arbitrarily large precision (inverse prior variance) of 1×10^{15} on the latent trait for Boxer and a prior mean of 1 and the identical precision likewise for Kyl. This is similar to the identification restriction employed in the non-Bayesian NOMINATE procedure (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Ideal points for the other senators, presidents, and secretaries were estimated with non-informative priors, assuming a distribution of $N(0,1)$. This is a standard restriction to produce a scale similar to the well-known -1 (very liberal) through 1 (very conservative) range. However, the posterior distribution of ideal points is not constrained to the $[-1,1]$ interval, and results of the measurement model presented later show that there are some legislators estimated to be more extreme than these points of -1 and 1 .

We estimate one latent dimension given the unidimensionality widely noted in contemporary American politics. Our estimates are based on 250,000 iterations of the Gibbs sampler, discarding the first 150,000 iterations as “burn-in.”²¹ We thinned the estimation,

¹⁹ Typically, scholars adopting similar identification restrictions have selected Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) and Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-MA). We have adopted this practice in our own work (Bertelli and Grose 2006, 2009). However, Helms and Kennedy did not serve in both chambers and Helms retired at the end of the 107th Congress. Of those legislators serving in both chambers and serving over the entire time period, Kyl and Boxer were the most conservative and liberal senator, respectively (based on Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE estimates).

²⁰ We use Jackman’s IDEAL routine to estimate the model.

²¹ Burn-in refers to the initial iterations discarded in order to remove draws taken when the sampler may be far off the mean and has not yet converged. We discarded a relatively large number of iterations (150,000) because of our interest in the ideal point estimates for cabinet secretaries. Given the lack of positions on a

recording every 100th iteration after the burn-in. Thus, our ideology estimates are the posterior means of the 100 total draws (100,000 divided by 100 = 1000).²²

number of votes by the secretaries, they were unlikely to converge quickly and thus we eliminated substantially more iterations than normally required (Clinton, Jackman, and Rivers 2004, 368).

²² We employed the Raftery-Lewis integrated diagnostic test to determine minimal appropriate run characteristics, which we exceeded with the values noted above. There were a few parameters where the values were only marginally exceeded, so we intend to run the sampler longer for more iterations in a future version of the paper.

Table A1: Cabinet Members in the Sample (1991-2004)[†]

<i>Department</i>	<i>Secretary's Name (Congress)</i>	<i>Appointed by, date confirmed</i>
Department of Agriculture	Edward Madigan (102 nd) Mike Espy (103 rd) Dan Glickman (104 th – 106 th) Ann Veneman (107 th -108 th)	George H.W. Bush, 3/7/91 Bill Clinton, 1/21/93 Bill Clinton, 3/30/95 George W. Bush, 1/20/01
Department of Commerce	Robert Mosbacher (102 nd) Ron Brown (103 rd -104 th) William Daley (105 th -106 th) Donald Evans (107 th - 108 th)	George H.W. Bush, 1/31/89 Bill Clinton, 1/21/93 Bill Clinton, 1/7/97 George W. Bush, 1/20/01
Department of Defense	William Perry (103 rd -104 th) William Cohen (105 th -106 th) Don Rumsfeld (107 th -108 th)	Bill Clinton, 2/3/94 Bill Clinton, 1/22/97 George W. Bush, 1/20/01
Department of Education	Richard Riley (103 rd -106 th) Rod Paige (107 th -108 th)	Bill Clinton, 1/21/93 George W. Bush, 1/20/01
Department of Energy	Hazel O'Leary (103 rd -104 th) Federico Pena (105 th) Bill Richardson (105 th -106 th) Spencer Abraham (107 th -108 th)	Bill Clinton, 1/21/93 Bill Clinton, 1/28/97 Bill Clinton, 7/31/98 George W. Bush, 1/20/01
Department of HHS	Donna Shalala (103 rd -106 th) Tommy Thompson (107 th -108 th)	Bill Clinton, 1/21/93 George W. Bush, 1/24/01
Dept. of Homeland Secur.	Tom Ridge (107 th -108 th)	George W. Bush, 1/22/03*
Department of HUD	Henry Cisneros (103 rd -104 th) Andrew Cuomo (105 th -106 th) Mel Martinez (107 th -108 th) Alphonso Jackson (108 th)	Bill Clinton, 1/21/93 Bill Clinton, 1/29/97 George W. Bush, 1/23/01 George W. Bush, 1/28/04
Department of Interior	Bruce Babbitt (103 rd -106 th) Gale Norton (107 th -108 th)	Bill Clinton, 1/21/93 George W. Bush, 1/30/01
Department of Justice	Janet Reno (103 rd)-106 th) John Ashcroft (107 th -108 th)	Bill Clinton, 3/11/93 George W. Bush, 2/1/01
Department of Labor	Lynn Martin (102 nd) Robert Reich (103 rd -104 th) Alexis Herman (105 th -106 th) Elaine Chao (107 th -108 th)	George H.W. Bush, 2/7/91 Bill Clinton, 1/21/93 Bill Clinton, 4/30/93 George W. Bush, 1/29/01
Department of State	Warren Christopher (103 rd -104 th) Madeleine Albright (105 th -106 th) Colin Powell (107 th -108 th)	Bill Clinton, 1/20/93 Bill Clinton, 1/22/97 George W. Bush, 1/20/01
Department of Transportation	Federico Pena (103 rd -104 th) Rodney Slater (105 th -106 th) Norman Mineta (107 th -108 th)	Bill Clinton, 1/21/93 Bill Clinton, 2/6/97 George W. Bush, 1/24/01

Department of Treasury	Lloyd Bentsen (103 rd) Robert Rubin (104 th -105 th) Lawrence Summers (106 th) Paul O'Neill (107 th) John Snow (108 th)	Bill Clinton, 1/20/93 Bill Clinton, 1/10/95 Bill Clinton, 7/1/99 George W. Bush, 1/20/01 George W. Bush, 1/30/03
Dept. of Veterans Affairs	Jesse Brown (103 rd -105 th) Togo West (105 th -106 th) Anthony Principi (107 th -108 th)	Bill Clinton, 1/21/93 Bill Clinton, 4/28/98 George W. Bush
Total	46 secretaries in 15 cabinet-level agencies	

† Cabinet secretaries not in this table are excluded due to the lack of coverage in the NEXIS congressional testimony database (e.g., few or no congressional testimonies were available).

*In the 107th Congress, Tom Ridge was appointed by the president unilaterally as an advisor to the president for homeland security, which did not require senate confirmation as the Department of Homeland Security had not yet been created. The department was founded in 2003 following legislative action in the 107th Congress (2001-02).