The Mentoring Faculty in Residence will present themselves and an EITM-based project they are currently developing (10 minutes plus 5 minute discussion). This project will serve as the basis for their presentation in the final week.

Monday 12:30-2:30pm. Introduction to EITM and its Goals

John H. Aldrich, James E. Alt, and Arthur Lupia. 2008. "The EITM Approach: Origins and Interpretations." Forthcoming in Henry E. Brady and Janet Box-Steffensmeier, (eds.) The Oxford Handbook on Political Methodology. Oxford University Press.
Granato, Jim, and Frank Scioli. 2004. "Puzzles, Proverbs, and Omega Matrices: The Scientific and Social Significance of the Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models (EITM)." Perspectives on Politics 2: 313-323.
Signorino, Curtis S. 2003. "Structure and Uncertainty in Discrete Choice Models," Political Analysis, Autumn; 11: 316-344.

Monday 3:00-5:00pm; 6:00-8:00pm. Participant Introductions

Each participant will lead an 8 minute session on their research interests, and in particular on the project they will be developing while at EITM. The purpose of these discussions will be to introduce everyone to your interests in a way that will help them help you improve your research design and make the most of your time at EITM. You should plan to give a five-minute presentation, leaving three minutes for Q&A.

Monday 8:00-9:00pm. Dessert session of mentors with mentees.

Tuesday 9:00-9:30am. Mentor-Mentee Meeting Time

Tuesday 9:30 -11:30am. Arrow’s Theorem and its Implications for Collective Choice

Amartya. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, 1970, Chapters 1-3*.
W. Riker, "Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the Study of Institutions," American Political Science Review, June, 1980.
A. Lupia and M. McCubbins, "Lost in Translation: Social Choice Theory is Misapplied Against Legislative Intent." Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, February, 2005.

Tuesday 1:30-3:00pm. Introducing Institutions: Agenda Control in a Spatial Model

D. Black, "On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making," Journal of Political Economy, February, 1948.
T. Romer and H. Rosenthal, "Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo," Public Choice, Winter, 1978.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1979. "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models." American Journal of Political Science 23 (1) (February):27‑59.

Tuesday Evening (TBA) Optional Session

"Introduction to Formal Modeling." A review of basic concepts and a discussion of game theory and causal inference.

Wednesday 9-10:00am. Mentor-Mentee Session

Wednesday 10:00-12:00am. Spatial Models and their Measurement

J. Aldrich & R.D. McKelvey. "A Method of Scaling with Applications to the 1968 and 1972 U.S. Presidential Elections," American Political Science Review, March, 1977.
K. Poole and H. Rosenthal, "A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call analysis," American Journal of Political Science, May, 1985, 357-384.
Kruskal, J.B. 1964. "Multidimensional Scaling by Optimizing Goodness of Fit to a Nonmetric Hypothesis," Psychometrika 29, 1, March, 1964: 1-27.
King, Gary, et al. 2004. "Enhancing the Validity and Cross-Cultural Comparability of Measurement in the Social Sciences." American Political Science Review. Corrected, 98:1, February.
R.D. McKelvey and R. Niemi. 1978. "A Multistage Game Representation of Sophisticated Voting for Binary Procedures." Journal of Economic Theory 18: 1-22.

Wednesday 1:30-4:30pm. Guest Lecture, John Patty, Harvard University

Patty, John W. 2007. "The House Discharge Procedure and Majoritarian Politics." Journal of Politics 69(3):678-688.
Patty, John W. 2008. “Equilibrium Party Government.” American journal of Political Science 52(3):636-655.
Patty, John W. and Elizabeth Maggie Penn. 2008. Amendments, Covering, and Agenda Control: The Politics of Open Rules. (working paper)

Thursday 9:00 -10:30. Group Presentations of First Assignment

Thursday 10:45-11:45. Guest Lecturer, Georg Vanberg, University of North Carolina

John Ferejohn and Barry R. Weingast. 1992. "A Positive Theory of Statutory Interpretation." International Review of Law and Economics 12:263-79.
Elisabeth R. Gerber, Arthur Lupia, Mathew D. McCubbins 2004. “When Does Government Limit the Impact of Voter Initiatives? The Politics of Implementation and Enforcement.” The Journal of Politics 66 (1), 43–68.
Jeff Segal. 1997. "Separation of Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts." American Political Science Review 91: 28-44.

Thursday 1:00-3:00. Judicial Politics

"The Value of Vagueness: Delegation, Defiance, and Judicial Opinions." Forthcoming, American Journal of Political Science.

Friday 9:00 -10:30. Group Presentations of Second Assignment

Friday 10:45-11:45. Institutions and Strategic Information Transmission

Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1998. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 1 and 3.
Arthur Lupia. 1994. "Short Cuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections." American Political Science Review 88: 63-76.

Friday 1:00-1:15. A Presentation by Jason Reifler on Next Week’s Experiment.

Friday 1:15-2:00. Modeling the Mind - I

Eric S. Dickson, Catherine Hafer, and Dmitri Landa. 2008. "Cognition and Strategy: A Deliberation Experiment." Forthcoming, The Journal of Politics.
Richard D. McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey, "An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game," Econometrica, Vol 60, No 4, July, 1992, 803-63.

Friday 2:15-3:30 Experiments on Information and Institutions II

Arthur Lupia and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1998. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? New York: Cambridge University Press. Chapters 6 and 7.

Department of Political Science, 326 Perkins Library, Box 90204, Duke University, Durham, NC 27708.

Phone 919.660.4300 -- Fax 919.660.4330