Spatial Modeling
Spatial models are a mainstay of political science research. During the 1990s, the JSTOR database
of twenty political science journals locates almost twenty articles per year that reference
spatial or dimensional models. Zero references are found for the 1940s and only about a score of
articles appear throughout the entire fifties and sixties. But the number of articles has
increased steadily from about one per year in the 1960's to the current level of almost 20 per
year. Students, therefore, should already be familiar with spatial models, so that our aims
during this week will be to synthesize the field in a new way and to use spatial models to link
empirical and theoretical research. Our synthesis will emphasize the common and unique features
of spatial models used in the study of international relations (Morrow, 1986), coalition
formation (Laver and Shepsle, 1996), legislatures (Krehbiel, 1988), partisan realignments
(Sundquist, 1983), and electoral politics (Enelow and Hinich, 1984). Empirical methods will be
presented for estimating the locations of actors in spatial models (e.g, Poole and Rosenthal,
1985) and for determining their goals (e.g., Kollman, Miller, and Page, 1992 and Morton, 1993 for
parties and Voeten, 2000b for nations). The ways different distributions of preferences, various
goals of the actors, and limited information affect the existence and the nature of equilibria
for the actors will be discussed in the context of classic deterministic and probabilistic
spatial models (Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Persson and Tabellini, 2000; Roemer, 2001). Then, we
will examine the dynamics of spatial models that follow from strategic considerations (e.g., Cox,
1990, 1997), from information gathering (e.g., McKelvey and Ordeshook 1985, 1986), and from
institutional constraints (e.g, Erikson and Romero, 1990; Merrill and Grofman, 1999; Londregan,
2000). This week will also review basic theoretical concepts such as preferences, utility and
loss functions, the dimensional structure of attitudes and opinions, maximizing and strategic
behavior by actors with various goals, simple game theoretic solutions to strategic interactions,
and methods for adding institutional details to stylized models.
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Syllabus
References
Notes:
Brady
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
Snyder Notes
Assignment
Solutions
Macropolitical Economy
The study of macroeconomics and politics has grown and increasingly unified theoretically,
although sophisticated empirical specification has perhaps lagged. This unit begins to redress
such gaps, exploring questions of how political and economic institutions, societal structures of
interest, and political strategic context shape economic policies and outcomes. In this
burgeoning field, some ask what distinguishes democracies from non-democracies, and, in
particular, what political-economic mechanisms undermine poor democracies or sustain rich ones
(e.g., Przeworski et al. 2000; Acemoglu and Robinson 2000)? Development economics and
democratization theory offer increasingly unified accounts of economic growth and franchise
development in, e.g., Robinson's sectoral, Boix's political-conflict, or H. Grossman's (1999) or
Grossman and Kim's (2000, 2002) predation models. Others study electoral and partisan democratic
competition, exploring the targeting of policy benefits or costs to specific or general
interests, policymaker accountability, and policy credibility (Persson and Tabellini 2000, Drazen
2000 offer textbook compilations), common-pool problems in policymaking (e.g., Alt and Lowry
1994), delegation and shared policy-control (Franzese 1999; 2002a,b), divided policy-control and
veto actors (Tsebelis 2002), and the dynamics of democratic stability (e.g., Collier and Hoeffler
2000 on rebellion, or Fearon and Laitin 1999 on insurgency), inter alia. Still others analyze the
degree to which and how international exposure ("globalization") constrains or otherwise modifies
domestic political-economic incentives in macro- and micro-economic policymaking (Rodrik 1999,
Boix 1998, Garrett 1998). Yet other new directions show how firm strategies to resolve commitment
or coordination problems in adjusting to exogenous shocks, reducing risk, bargaining over wages
and working conditions, securing a skilled labor force, and getting finance depend on multiple
institutional interactions (Hall and Soskice 2001). And yet other recent research explores
conditional variations of the traditional core political-economic tradeoff between inequality and
redistribution, with redistribution efficient (Iversen and Soskice 2001) or inefficient (Acemoglu
and Robinson 2000) but always political (Moene and Wallerstein 2001). These sessions will utilize
several recent and outstanding textbook compilations of such macro-political-economy theory
(Drazen 2000; Persson and Tabellini 2000; Grossman and Helpman 2001), leveraging work-horse
models of electoral and partisan policy and outcome manipulation and the multiple contextual
(institutional, interest-structural, etc.) conditionality of such political-economic cycles
(Franzese 2002c surveys) in particular as bases from which to illustrate (a) the development of
empirical specifications that more directly reflect such political-economy models and (b) the
discovery from such theoretical models of alternative empirical venues from which to obtain
leverage on their political-economic propositions. Empirical methods explored in this context may
include, for example, nonlinear statistical models (Franzese 1999, 2002a,b), experimentation,
non- and semi-parametric techniques, etc.
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Syllabus
References
Notes:
Notes 1
Notes 2
Londregan
[1]
[2]
[3]
Franzese
[1]
[2]
Adolph Notes
Assignments:
[1]
[2]
Answers:
[1]
[2]
Institutional Models
The development of theories of institutional models of politics flourished over the last
twenty-five years. Long a mainstay of rational choice theory (e.g., Black, 1958; Buchanan and
Tullock, 1962), the revival of interest in such institutional models can be traced, on the one
hand, to the failure of equilibrium in so-called "institution free" or "pure preference
aggregation" models, especially in majority voting (McKelvey, 1976; Schofield, 1978; Riker,
1980). They can be traced, on the other hand, to the positive examples in which institutional
models seemed to solve those problems, especially Shepsle (1979). In these cases, institutional
models have been most developed in terms of the use of rules as constraints on otherwise
open-ended (typically) majority-rule procedures. Thus, for example, committees in the U.S.
Congress can fail to report a bill to the floor (Shepsle, 1979), presidents can veto legislative
proposals (Cameron, 2000), votes of confidence can overturn majority governing coalitions in
parliaments (Diermeier and Stevenson, 1999; 2000), etc. Another set of models flow from
developments in game theory, such as those that relate to information. Gilligan and Krehbiel
(1987; 1989; 1990) developed such models for a Congress-like institution, which Krehbiel (1991)
tested on data from the U.S. Congress, often looking at many of the same institutions (e.g.,
committees) for very different sorts of policies. Austen-Smith (1990a, 1990b) and Austen-Smith
and Riker (1987, 1990) developed informational models for legislative debate, and Calvert (e.g.,
1992, 1995) did so in more general terms. Information and access are central to models of the
relationship between organized interests and legislators in both policy making and electoral
roles (e.g., Snyder, 1990; Denzau and Munger, 1986; Grier, Munger, and Roberts, 1994). Another
stream of topics, often but not always in closely related models, builds linkages across
institutions or decision-making arenas. Notable here are delegation and bargaining models, such
as Cox and McCubbins (1993) for political parties; Epstein and O'Halloran (1999) for
understanding delegation across separated powers. These models can address questions about such
important substantive topics as representation, political parties, and constitutional design.
Finally, there are important works on multiple goals and the role of institutions as selection
devices, often applied to bureaucracies, such as Carpenter (1996; 2001), Brehm and Gates (1997),
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (e.g., 1989). The goal, therefore, is to expand the range of
testable models of institutions as the outcome of equilibrating processes or as creating or
selecting among alternative equilibrium outcomes.
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Syllabus
References
Notes:
Aldrich
[1]
[2]
Lupia
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
McCarty
[1]
[2]
[3]
Diermeier Notes
Problem Sets:
[1]
[2]
Institutions, Bureaucratic Performance, & Political Behavior
This week explores Empirical Implications of Institutional Models. It traces the origins,
successful development, and potentially problematic aspects of the New Institutionalism,
combining lectures and innovative class activities to understand modern studies of the causes and
consequences of institutional choices. Activities use examples of bureaucratic performance and
voter competence (plus Congressional organization, election laws, separation of powers, coalition
bargaining, jury decision-making, political development, etc.). The week also addresses (a) some
constructive debates on the appropriateness to political contexts of the modern proliferation of
equilibrium concepts and statistical-estimation procedures, (b) how incomplete information
affects institutional efficacy, and (c) innovative data-collection methods. Past work teaches
critical lessons, but this week aims to improve the scientific and social value of new research,
helping to shape the new new institutionalism.
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Syllabus
Notes:
Aldrich and Lupia
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
Extensive Form
Games and
Nash Equilibrium
Notes
Diermeier Notes
Epstein
[1]
[2]
Assignment
Complex-systems, Agent-based, & Computational Models
This week focuses on complex-systems models and their use in describing and analyzing the choice
and effects of political institutions. The week divides into three parts. First, it presents some
basic models and concepts from complex-systems theory. Second, it shows how to apply these
techniques to the study of formal and informal political institutions. Third, it describes how to
evaluate these models empirically using historical-comparative and experimental data.
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Syllabus
Notes:
Page
[1]
[2]
[3]
Kollman
[1]
[2]
[3]
Tassier
[1]
[2]
Theoretical & Empirical Models in International Relations
Over the last two decades, formal models and statistical methodology have become two of the most
dynamic areas of international-relations research. Although each has noticed the other, only
rarely have theoretical models explicitly structured statistical analyses. This week aims to
forge and strengthen such bonds. It covers the use of formal models to elaborate theories in
international relations and how properly to test those models with statistical and other
empirical methods. Participants will conduct research projects to build their skills and to
illustrate the key issues.
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Syllabus
Notes:
Morrow
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
Signorino
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
Huth Notes
Schultz
[1]
[2]
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Mini-Units and Guests:
2002:
Cederman
Syllabus
[1]
[2]
[3]
Sartori Notes
2003:
Bernhard and Leblang Notes
Hays Notes
Franzese
[1]
[2]
[3]
