Explaining Institutional Changes: Soaking, Poking, and Modeling in the U.S. Congress
John H. Aldrich and Kenneth A. Shepsle
Abstract
In this paper, we argue that a scientific explanation of political institutions is possible. It is, however, a more complex process to explain the development of political institutions than it is to explain many other social institutions and than it is to explain many other types of political behavior. The complications are due to institutional changes often being made by the same actors who choose political outcomes within those institutions (the so-called endogeneity problem, combined with individual agency) and to the historical sequencing of institutions and their changes (the so-called path dependence problem).
We begin the theoretical task by assessing the importance of rational choice theoretic accounts in politics and their special importance for explaining institutional politics. We conclude, however, that rational choice theory may be necessary but is often insufficient for explaining institutions and their changes. We argue for the importance of wedding the methods of "soaking and poking" to rational choice reasoning. We also argue for the importance of context and sequence, and suggest that this combination promises to offer necessary and sufficient explanations of institutional politics. We argue, that is, for a science of politics that merges the principal contributions of William Riker and Richard Fenno.