John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde
Abstract
In this paper, we extend our theory and measurement of conditional
party government. We define the “condition” in conditional party
government more precisely, offering a formal illustration that indicates
how, when the condition is more rather than less well satisfied, the majority
party may skew outcomes from the center of the floor toward the center
of their party. We then provide a number of measures designed to
illustrate variation in the degree to which this condition has been satisfied
in post-War Congresses. The evidence suggests that the condition
was relatively more fully satisfied in the early post-War years, its degree
of satisfaction declined in the 1960s and 1970s, from which point its degree
of satisfaction increased. By the mid-1990s, the condition was at
a (relative) peak of satisfaction. Finally, we examine variations
over time in two variables concerning the intra-legislative party to provide
at least a preliminary indication whether partisan rules and powers might
have been used to achieve majority party preferred outcomes. As our
theory predicts, their use increased as the degree to which the condition
was satisfied increased.