The purpose of this project was to investigate the gap between the military and American society: its extent, whether it is growing or narrowing, and the implications for military effectiveness and civil-military cooperation. The project produced the most systematic and comprehensive data ever collected analyzing civil-military attitudes, perspectives, and opinions. The studies analyzing those data and integrating them with other sociological, interpretive, and historical data are being published in prominent academic and policy outlets, thus offering a research agenda for the coming years not only on a gap between military and civilian, but on civil-military relations more generally. The project results stimulated extensive discussion in the national and international media and received concentrated attention from civilian and military policymakers at the highest levels of the United States government. Numerous follow-on projects have been launched assessing the TISS findings, amplifying them, and putting them into comparative perspective, thus ensuring that the project will have continuing impact for many years to come.

A central and recurring problem for American policy makers has been the need to reconcile the distinctive culture and mission of the armed forces with America's democratic ideals and practices. The issue has returned with a vengeance since the end of the Cold War and is at the center of much of the recent controversy attending military policy. Our project advanced public discussion of these issues by providing objective, dispassionate, focused, scholarship and policy analysis, including new data in the form of opinion surveys of military and civilian elites, and the civilian general population.

The project marshalled sophisticated methods of survey research, cultural and political analysis, and historical inquiry, to address a tailored set of questions about the nature and significance of the gap between military and civilian culture, including:

• Do post-Cold War military attitudes, opinions, and perspectives diverge from those in civilian society, and if so, why?
• Is this divergence, if it exists, growing, and if so, why?
• How does the culture gap affect policy in the areas of grand strategy, operations, and force structure? Does a widening gap lead to civilian ignorance of, or insensitivity to, military culture and ultimately to policies, directives, or undertakings that undermine the military? How does, or might in the future, a divergence or gap affect civil-military relationships?

Surveys of civilian and military elites and the general public were completed in Spring 1999. Drafts of the studies were released to the public in late October 1999 and produced a public debate conducted in the media and in policymaking circles through Spring 2001. Versions of the studies have been published in The National Interest (Fall 2000), Armed Forces & Society (Winter 2001), and in Soldiers and Civilians: The Civil-Military Gap and American National Security (MIT University Press, 2001).

The project addressed national concerns as articulated by numerous prominent experts. The following quotes are illustrative of the range of perspectives on this important topic.

Brent Scowcroft
"...[military service] changes one's way of thinking and gives one a sense of patriotism, a sense of working for something bigger than one's self. I think it also helps to provide a more realistic view of what the American military can and cannot do. Nothing ever works the way it is supposed to in the military. Not only is [President Clinton] the first president to lack that military experience in quite a while, the same goes for the Congress and the rest of the country. It is difficult to say what the consequences will be, but with the lessened contact between the American people and the military, I believe the results will not be healthy."
From "Judgment and Experience: George Bush's Foreign Policy," Presidential Judgement (Institute of Politics, 2001), pp. 114-115.

Admiral Bill Owens
"Although the constitutional and legal principles regarding civilian control over the military remain sound, I believe actual control is becoming more difficult." p. 52

"Finally, there is a political dimension to military professionalism thatbears watching. Like any organization that identified itself as distinctfrom the wider society, military people can be vulnerable to the elitistattitude that only they--and not the wider civilian community--know what isbest in military matters. I believe that this attitude has become morewidespread in the military over the past twenty-seven years with the end ofthe draft and the shift of the armed forces to an all-volunteer military,with the unintended consequence that the two communities have fewerconnections than during the Cold War. (The role of the soldier in ademocratic society attracted significant research in decades past but is notan area of much interest today.) p. 53

Then he completely discounts the possibility of a coup, but says:
"On the contrary, a continuing gap between military leaders and civilianofficials could well result in situations where civilian officials fail topress and to challenge the military leadership on serious issues. . . . Weshould be concerned if the gap between military and civilian communitieswidens to the point that civilian leaders believe only the military can makecompetent decisions about military issues. This state of affairs could cometo pass if civilian authorities do not care about or understand militarydoctrines. It can emerge from programming and budgeting processes thatyield to military officials the decision-making power. It is more likely tohappen when the military profession is highly respected, yet when publicinterest in military affairs slackens, and when the sons and daughters whomake up the military ranks come from a narrower segment of the population.If you think this sounds a bit like a description of the United Statestoday, you're correct." p. 54
From Admiral Bill Owens with Ed Offley. Lifting the Fog of War (New York:Farrar, Straus, Giroux), 2000.

Richard Danzig (Secretary of the Navy):
"If the need for American military power is seen as less compelling, if the Pentagon is seen as wasteful, and, at the same time, our military leadership is perceived as distant and different from much of American society, will the military be sustained in its need for resources? In its frequently controversial operations? In its recruitment? Our third great risk of failure is that the United States may become less than fully committed to its military."

"Our military cannot live apart from our society. That risk is low for our diverse and fluctuating enlisted ranks. It is high for our much smaller and less representative corps of career officers."

"To allow the military services to drift away from the society that must nurture them is to put great institutions in great jeopardy."
From The Big Three: Our Greatest Security Risks and How to Address Them. Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University. 1999.

John McCain (Senator R-AZ):
"When it comes time to make the decision to send our young men and women into harm's way, the decision should be made by a leader who knows that such decisions have profound consequences. There comes a time when a nation's leader can no longer rely on briefing books and talking points, when the experts and the advisers have all weighed in . . . For no matter how many others are involved in the decision, the President is a lonely man . . . when the casualty reports come in. I am not afraid of the burden."
From David Broder. "McCain Sets 'New Patriotic Challenge'" The Washington Post 28 September 1999: A01.

"It's a fundamental principle that armed services can truly serve a democracy only if they are a reflection of that society and are impacted by the same social trends."
From George Will. "Civilian-Military Cultural Gap Widens" Times-Picayune 23 November 1998.

"I appreciate that the all-volunteer force has been very successful, but we are raising a generation of not only leaders but middle-income Americans who have never served their country . . . I worry about a greater estrangement, a greater distancing between the Congress, traditional protectors of the military, and the military itself. And I worry about a lack of appreciation for the rigors of military life."
From Thomas W. Lippman. "Socially and Politically, Nation Feels the Absence of a Draft" The Washington Post, 8 September 1998: A13.

John W. Warner (Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee):
"We are faced every day that we get up with fewer and fewer young men and women willing to sign on the dotted line and take up an initial career in the United States military. Even though this bill [to raise pay/benefits] is expensive, the alternative is unacceptable."
From Rowan Scarborough. "Senate, Clinton differ on Military Pay Raise" Washington Times, 24 February 1999, pg. 9.

William S. Cohen (Secretary of Defense):
"What we want to do is reconnect America to its military"
From Scarborough, Rowan. "A Battle Cry Issued in Support of U.S. Military" Washington Times, 29 January 1999.

". . . perhaps, because we live in largely peaceful time, most Americans tend not to think about those who endure the risks and trials so that we can enjoy this tranquillity."
From his Commencement Address, Ohio Wesleyan University, 10 May 1998.

"So one of the challenges for me is to somehow prevent a chasm from developing between the military and civilian worlds, where the civilian world doesn't fully grasp the mission of the military, and the military doesn't understand why the memories of our citizens and civilian policy makers are so short, or why the criticism is so quick and so unrelenting."
From Remarks to Yale University, 26 September 1997.

George Will (Syndicated Columnist):
"There should be a gap between civilian and military cultures, especially in a democracy. That widening gap should be narrowed somewhat, but not by permeating the military with the civilian culture's values... . Civilian society, if it thinks the gap between it and its military is too wide, might try moving toward the military."
From "Civilian-Military Cultural Gap Widens," The Times-Picayune, 23 November 1998: B5.

Louis Caldera (Secretary of the Army):
"Our challenge, at a time when fewer people have served or have a connection with the military, is to build a strong base of support and appreciation for what soldiers do, and to challenge young people, especially, to think about their obligation to serve . . ."
From an interview by Paul Richter in the Los Angeles Times, 22 November 1998.

Henry H. Shelton (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff):
"While I understand the concerns, I do not believe the people who wear the uniform of the United States are disconnected from the rest of American society or are in danger of becoming isolated."
"While differences between service in the military and life in the civilian world will always exist, the military must remain connected with the American people."
From "The American Military is Still in Close Contact with Civilians," Biloxi Sun Herald, 19 October 1998.

Charles Moskos (Professor, Sociology, Northwestern University):
". . . because if you've never served, you become either hostile or obsequious to the military."
From Thomas W. Lippman. "Socially and Politically, Nation Feels the Absence of a Draft" The Washington Post, 8 September 1998: A13.

John J. Hamre (Deputy Secretary of Defense):
"The average American knows very little about the military anymore . . . and even more troubling, the average middle- and upper middle-class family doesn't tend to look on the military as a career they want their kids to follow . . ."
From Thomas W. Lippman. "Socially and Politically, Nation Feels the Absence of a Draft" The Washington Post, 8 September 1998: A13.

Les Aspin (Congressman; later Secretary of Defense):
"Many Washington power brokers have no experience of what the military's all about . . . [A]lmost anywhere you look here there's a diminishing pool of people with military experience."
From Charles Peters. "Tilting at Windmills" Washington Monthly, September 1995.

General John Shalikashvili (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff):
"My feeling is that [National Security Advisor Lake] must always be conscious when it comes to making military decisions on the use of military power that the President had not served and that he had not served . . . the decisions would probably be easier because he would then have been a member of the 'club,' if you will."
From Jason DeParle. "The Man Inside Bill Clinton's Foreign Policy" New York Times, 20 August 1995.

For more information, contact us via email at: hart@duke.edu or visit the Triangle Institute for Security Studies at: www.unc.edu/depts/tiss/webpage.htm